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Price Competition and the Impact of Service Attributes: structural estimation and
analytical characterizations of equilibrium behavior
Margaret Pierson
This dissertation addresses a number of outstanding, fundamental questions in operations
management and industrial organization literature. Operations management literature
has a long history of studying the competitive impact of operational, firm-level strategic
decisions within oligopoly markets.
The first essay reports on an empirical study of an important industry, the drive-thru
fast-food industry. We estimate a competition model, derived from an underlying Mixed
MultiNomial Logit (MNML) consumer choice model, using detailed empirical data. The
main goal is to measure to what extent waiting time performance, along with price levels,
brand attributes, geographical and demographic factors, impacts competing firms’ market
shares.
The primary goal of our second essay is to characterize the equilibrium behavior
of price competition models with Mixed Multinomial Logit (MMNL) demand functions
under affine cost structures. In spite of the huge popularity of MMNL models in both
the theoretical and empirical literature, it is not known, in general, whether a Nash
equilibrium (in pure strategies) of prices exists, and whether the equilibria can be uniquely
characterized as the solutions to the system of First Order Condition (FOC) equations.
The third essay, which is the most general in its context, we establish that in the
absence of cost efficiencies resulting from a merger, aggregate profits of the merging firms
increase as do equilibrium prices for general price competition models with general non-
linear demand and cost functions as long as the models are supermodular, with two
additional structural conditions: (i) each firm’s profit function is strictly quasi-concave
in its own price(s), and (ii) markets are competitive, i.e., in the pre-merger industry,
each firm’s profits increase when any of his competitors increases his price, unilaterally.
Even the equilibrium profits of the remaining firms in the industry increase, while the
consumer ends up holding the bag, i.e., consumer welfare declines. As demonstrated by
this essay, the answers to these sorts of strategy questions have implications not only for
the firms and customers but also the policy makers policing these markets.
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Operations management literature has a long history of studying the competitive impact
of operational, firm-level strategic decisions within oligopoly markets. The literature
on competition in the service industry, the context of our first essay, dates back to the
late 1970s when Luski (1976) and Levhari and Luski (1978) were the first to model
competition between service providers. Other strategic decisions often studied at the
market level include inventory, assortment, and quality decisions (see, e.g., Olivares and
Cachon (2009) and Gans (2002). As demonstrated by our third essay, the answers to
these sorts of strategy questions have implications not only for the firms and customers
but also the policy makers policing these markets. Modeling and estimation techniques
have been evolving since the inception of this area of research. Of particular import to
the methods used in the first two essays were the introduction of an empirical method
for estimating consumer choice models and cost structures in oligopolistic markets with
differentiated goods by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and the extension of this work
to the case where market shares are not observed by Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995), and
the seminal paper, Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), which establishes sufficient conditions for
the existence of a price equilibrium when the demand functions are based on a broad
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class of MMNL models used in the so called BLP method. The third essay, which is the
most general in its context, contributes to a stream of literature which seeks to respond
to the seemingly paradoxical results of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983). In addition
to our contributions to the study and practice of operations management we add to
the economics literature on empirical industrial organization and coalition formation in
oligopoly settings.
1.2 Overview
Through a series of essays, this dissertation examines three topics in industrial organiza-
tion for oligopoly markets with differentiated products. A variety of modeling techniques
ranging from stylized models to empirical investigations are employed in each problem.
The first essay focuses on competition in service industries. In many such industries,
companies compete with each other on the basis of the waiting time their customers’
experience, along with other strategic instruments such as the price they charge for their
service. The objective of this essay is to conduct an empirical study of an important
industry to measure to what extent waiting time performance impacts different firms’
market shares and price decisions. We report on a large scale empirical industrial or-
ganization study in which the demand equations for fast-food drive-thru restaurants in
Cook County are estimated based on so-called structural estimation methods. Our re-
sults confirm the belief, expressed by industry experts, that in the fast-food drive-thru
industry customers trade off price with waiting time. More interestingly, our estimates
indicate that consumers attribute a very high cost to the time they spend waiting. In
the second essay, we support the estimation method in our first essay by addressing an
open question in the economics literature. We postulate a general class of price competi-
tion models with Mixed Multinomial Logit demand functions under affine cost functions.
We first characterize the equilibrium behavior of this class of models in the case where
each product in the market is sold by a separate, independent firm and customers share
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a common income level. We identify a simple and very broadly satisfied condition un-
der which a Nash equilibrium exists while the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the
solutions of the system of First Order Condition equations, a property of essential im-
portance to empirical studies. This condition specifies that in every market segment,
each firm captures less than 50% of the potential customer population when pricing at a
level which, under the condition, can be shown to be an upper bound for a rational price
choice for the firm irrespective of the prices chosen by its competitors. We show that
under a somewhat stronger, but still broadly satisfied version of the above condition, a
unique equilibrium exists. We complete the picture, establishing the existence of a Nash
equilibrium, indeed a unique Nash equilibrium, for markets with an arbitrary degree of
concentration; under sufficiently tight price bounds. We then discuss three extensions of
our model: unequal customer income, a continuum of customer types, and the case of
multi-product firms. The essay concludes with a discussion of implications for structural
estimation methods. Fundamental to our understanding of competitive dynamics in an
oligopolistic industry is the question of what impact mergers and acquisitions have on
key equilibrium performance measures. In the third and final essay, we address these
questions in the context of price competition models with differentiated goods, allowing
for general non-linear demand and cost functions merely assuming that both the pre-
and post-merger competition games are supermodular along with two minor technical
conditions. We show that, in the absence of cost synergies, post-merger equilibrium
prices exceed their pre-merger levels. Moreover, the post-merger equilibrium profit of the
merged firms exceeds the pre-merger aggregate of the equilibrium profits of the merging
firms. Finally, we show that the equilibrium profit of the non-merging firms increases
as well. We establish our results, at first, for settings where each firm in the industry
offers a single product; we then generalize them to industries with general multi-product
firms. We also derive conditions under which cost synergies by themselves result in lower
equilibrium prices and discuss how the combined effect of increased market concentration
and cost synergies can be assessed efficiently.
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1.3 How much is a reduction of your customers’ wait
worth? An empirical study of the fast-food drive-
thru industry based on structural estimation meth-
ods.
This essay reports on an empirical study of an important industry, the drive-thru fast-
food industry. We estimate a competition model, derived from an underlying Mixed
MultiNomial Logit (MNML) consumer choice model, using detailed empirical data. The
main goal is to measure to what extent waiting time performance, along with price levels,
brand attributes, geographical and demographic factors, impacts competing firms’ market
shares. In the literature it is commonly assumed that customers attribute a cost rate to
their waiting time that can be proxied by an earnings rate, for example the disposable
per capita income in the market (see e.g. Mueller (1985)). Our results demonstrate that
this may result in questionable policy analyses as we find that customers attribute an
implicit value to their wait time, which is many times the average wage in the US. We
also characterize how the market’s price equilibrium responds to changes in the waiting
time standards. Based on this market analysis, we show that the trend to continuously
improve waiting times and service levels can be explained on game-theoretical grounds,
creating a valuable framework for future market dynamics studies in various industries.
While our empirical study is focused on the drive-thru fast-food industry, we apply a
methodology based on structural estimation methods frequently used in the Industrial
Organization literature which, mutatis mutandis, can be employed to establish the impact
service attributes have on market shares in other industries.
In many service industries, companies compete with each other on the basis of the
waiting time (or other service quality attributes) their customers experience, along with
other strategic instruments such as their price. Executives realize that time is money
for the consumer but it is unclear how much money, how the exchange rate differs in
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different industries, and how it varies with other factors such as location, brand etcetera.
Often, specific waiting time standards or guarantees are advertised. For example, in 2002
Ameritrade increased its market share in the online discount brokerage market by “guar-
anteeing” that equity trades take no more than 10 seconds to be executed; the guarantee
is backed up with a commission waiver if the time limit is violated. This led most major
online brokerage firms (E-trade, Fidelity) to offer and aggressively advertise even more
ambitious waiting time standards. Various call centers promise that the customer will be
helped within one hour, say, possibly by a callback. In other industries, average waiting
times are monitored by independent organizations. For example, in the airline industry
independent government agencies as well as Internet travel services report, on a flight
by flight basis, the average delay and percentage of flights arriving within 15 minutes of
schedule. See Allon and Federgruen (2007) for a longer list of examples.
A fundamental premise of the by now extensive theoretical literature on service com-
petition is the belief that waiting times have a major impact on consumer choices and
market shares, similar to or perhaps even in excess of price differentials. However, this
premise has rarely been substantiated by empirical field studies. In the fast-food indus-
try, almost all outlets are owned by independent franchisees who select their own prices.
In contrast, chains set national waiting time standards by prescribing a uniform oper-
ational process to their franchisees along with specific recipes for their standard menu
items. These processes include standard customer greetings, order taking, the maximum
number of burgers on a grill and amount of time they may be cooking, the relationship
between number of drive-thru lanes and demand volume etcetera, all of which determine
the chain’s waiting time standard; see Garber (2005) and Jargon (2006). DeHoratius et al.
(2010) describe how tightly the McDonald’s chain standardizes and engineers the service
operations process of its outlets. Since chains implement a national uniform waiting time
(distribution), we were able to obtain these distributions from a national Drive-Thru
Time Study Database, which we purchased from the industry organization QSR.
Chains invest heavily to shave seconds off their average waiting times, clearly believing
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that their market shares are very sensitive to the relative waiting times experienced.
Hughlett (Nov 28, 2008) attributes the following statement to the president of one of the
main technology vendors serving the fast-food industry: “There is an industry maxim
that for every seven-second reduction in total service time, sales will increase by 1% over
time”1. It is the belief expressed in this maxim which underlies the chains’ continuous
strategic focus on waiting time reductions in their outlets, via technological and process
improvements. An estimate of the expected consumer response to reductions in waiting
time standards, such as that generated by our study, would be of high value to the industry
when evaluating the potential profitability of investments of this type. We therefore look
to support these beliefs via an empricial study of a large fast-food drive-thru market,
focusing on the following series of research questions, of equal interest to the academic
community and the competing chains in the (fast-food) industry.
1. Does the customer’s waiting time at the fast-food drive-thru lane represent a sig-
nificant determinant of consumer choices and resulting market shares, as believed
by the industry and operations management literature alike?
2. When comparing the demand sensitivity to waiting time and price differentials, is
the implied value of time of the same order of magnitude as the average wage or
income earned per hour? If not, is it of a larger or smaller order of magnitude?
3. Can the above stated industry maxim be substantiated by empirical estimates? In
particular, when taking into account that the various outlets are likely to adjust
their prices in response to reduced waiting time standards, adopting a new price
equilibrium, does the maxim hold?
4. Furthermore, this maxim expresses the belief that a given waiting time reduction is
equally valuable for all chains in terms of resulting increases in market shares and
sales. Plausible consumer choice models may imply that these benefits, in fact, vary
1We interpret the 1% increase in sales to refer to a 1% increase in market share, rather than observed
sales dollars. As discussed below, we verify that, with this intepretation, the industry maxim is on
average correct. See Section 3.3 for estimates of the impact on both measures
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with the initial market shares of the chains, either in a robustly predictable way or
one that depends on the specific parameter estimates. Either way, it is important to
understand to what extent these benefits vary with the size of the chain and other
chain attributes. In addition, do the increases in market shares accrue primarily
from customers switching between chains or from the acquisition of new customers
to the fast-food market?
Our empirical research thus follows a slight variant of the standard paradigm as dis-
cussed, for example, by Fisher (2007), see Figure 5 ibid. Our starting point is a series
of premises, maxims and questions which arise from the theoretical operations manage-
ment literature on service competition as well as practitioner discussions and surveys
in the fast-food industry, reported in such outlets as the industry organization’s main
publication, the QSR magazine, the Nation’s Restaurant News, and the general press.
As mentioned, almost all contributions to the literature on service competition have
been theoretical, with numerical investigations confined to small hypothetical examples.
Indeed, we believe ours to be one of the first market-wide empirical studies to complement
the theoretical service competition literature.There are several reasons for the paucity of
empirical studies. It is very difficult to access data regarding customer waiting times,
in particular when seeking to quantify the waiting time experience at all competing ser-
vice providers. While absolute waiting times at a given firm might explain the firm’s
demand volume in a monopoly setting, it is the relative waiting times at various com-
peting providers which, along with the firms’ other strategic choices, explain ultimate
consumer choices and hence, realized market shares. Similarly, it is typically very hard,
if not impossible, to collect data on sales volumes or market shares of the competing out-
lets. Although such data are sometimes accessible for consumer products, in the service
industry it is rare that sales volumes can be gathered by outsiders. Firms are reluc-
tant to provide the information, considering it of the highest strategic value. Indeed,
sales volumes were unavailable in our context. Instead, we infer them by estimating the
parameters in the system of equations characterizing the unique equilibrium in a compe-
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tition game resulting from a detailed consumer choice model and an outlet cost structure
reflecting a broad category of queueing systems. In other words, the demand function
parameters are backed out from the equilibrium conditions, with the help of the observed
equilibrium. This technique has been applied in a number of economics studies, e.g.,
Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) and Thomadsen (2005a) but, to our knowledge, not in
the operations management literature.
More specifically, we accommodate the absence of demand data with three assump-
tions: (1) Consumers attribute a utility level to each potential outlet which depends
stochastically on price, waiting time, the distance to the outlet and various chain char-
acteristics. Similarly, consumers assign a utility level to the no-purchase option, which
depends stochastically on the consumer’s gender, race, age bracket and occupational sta-
tus. (2) Outlets encounter a cost structure which is affine in the sales volume, with
random noise terms for the marginal costs; this cost structure applies to many queueing
models used to describe the service process such as M/M/1 systems or open Jackson net-
works. (3) Outlets adopt a pure Nash equilibrium in the price competition model which
results from the above consumer choice model and the outlets’ cost structure.
The first assumption is used to derive the relationships between prices, service levels,
and sales quantities. Based on the second and third assumptions, these relationships are
subsequently used to derive the firms’ Nash equilibrium conditions to jointly estimate the
parameters of the indirect utility functions of the consumers as well as the parameters
of the outlets’ cost structure. Our estimation method is a Generalized Method of Mo-
ments (GMM) technique, as opposed to more standard maximum likelihood estimators
for systems of non-linear equations, for reasons explained in Section 5.
In summary, the main contribution of this essay is that, to our knowledge, it is one
of the first to estimate, for the benefit of market observers and the firms alike, how sales
volumes for a service organization depend on the prices and waiting times of all com-
peting providers within a given region, their location, as well as other attributes (e.g.,
brand-specific characteristics). In particular, we conclude that consumers attribute a
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value to their waiting time which is many times the average wage level. We use coun-
terfactual studies to confirm that a seven-second reduction by a single chain results, on
“average”, in a 1% market share increase for that chain. However, for a large chain like
McDonald’s, the increase is more than 3%, showing that the industry’s “7 second rule”
needs to be qualified. The increased market share results primarily from the acquisition
of new customers who were previously opting for the outside good as opposed to cusomers
switching between chains. Our model explains the continuing trend of all chains investing
heavily to reduce their waiting time standards. We show, in addition, that neglecting to
include any waiting time measure in the consumer choice model results in significantly
over-estimated price sensitivities. This validates our belief that overlooking service as a
competitive instrument in the model specification results in distorted managerial insights.
Not accounting for the waiting time as an attribute also distorts the estimated value of
the no-purchase option, as well as the importance of the number of chain outlets, as a
proxy for the consumers’ perceived quality of the chain.
1.4 Price Competition under Multinomial Logit De-
mand Functions with Random Coefficients
Our primary goal in this essay is to characterize the equilibrium behavior of price
competition models with Mixed Multinomial Logit (MMNL) demand functions under
affine cost structures. In such models, the market is partitioned into a finite set or a
continuous spectrum of customer segments, differentiated by, for example, demographic
attributes, income level, and/or geographic location. In each market segment, the firms’
sales volumes are given by a Multinomial Logit Model (MNL). In spite of the huge
popularity of MMNL models in both the theoretical and empirical literature, it is not
known, in general, whether a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies2) of prices exists, and
whether the equilibria can be uniquely characterized as the solutions to the system of First
2Henceforth, ‘equilibrium’ will refer to pure strategy equilibrium unless otherwise stated.
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Order Condition (FOC) equations. (This system of equations is obtained by specifying
that all firms’ marginal profit values equal zero.) Indeed, as elaborated on in the next
section, there are many elementary price competition models in which either no or a
multiplicity of Nash equilibrium exist.
Consider, for example, the seminal paper by Berry et al. (1995) studying market
shares in the United States automobile industry which introduced, at least in the em-
pirical industrial organization literature, a new estimation methodology to circumvent
the problem that prices, as explanatory variables of sales volumes, are typically endoge-
nously determined. The paper postulates a MMNL model for the industry. One of the
empirical methods developed in the paper is based on estimating the model parameters
as those under which the observed price vector satisfies the FOC equations. The authors
acknowledge (in their footnote 12) that it is unclear whether their model possesses an
equilibrium, let alone a unique equilibrium. Even if these questions can be answered
in the affirmative, so that the observed price vector can be viewed as the unique price
equilibrium, it is unclear whether it is necessarily identified by the FOC equations which
the estimation method relies on3.
In a more recent example, Thomadsen (2005b) pointed out that in many empirical
studies the distance between the consumer and each of the competing product outlets or
service providers is naturally and essentially added to the specification of the utility value.
(Examples following this practice include Manuszak (2000), Dube et al. (2002), Bradlow
et al. (2005), Thomadsen (2005a), Davis (2006) and Chapter 2 of this dissertation.) Dis-
tance attributes depend jointly on the firm and the consumer. Such geography-dependent
utility functions can be cast as special cases of the general model in Caplin and Nalebuff
3In their footnote 12, Berry et al. (1995) wrote “We assume that a Nash equilibrium to this pricing
game exists, and that the equilibrium prices are in the interior of the firms’ strategy sets (the positive
orthant). While Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) provide a set of conditions for the existence of equilibrium
for related models of single product firms, their theorems do not easily generalize to the multi-product
case. However, we are able to check numerically whether our final estimates are consistent with the
existence of an equilibrium. Note that none of the properties of the estimates require uniqueness of
equilibrium, although without uniqueness it is not clear how to use our estimates to examine the effects
of policy and environmental changes.”. We explain several of the reasons why the conditions in Caplin
and Nalebuff (1991) fail to apply to the BLP model, beyond it’s multi-product feature in Section 3.5.1
footnote 10.
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(1991) the most frequently employed foundation for the existence of an equilibrium. How-
ever, Thomadsen (2005b) points out that the conditions in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)
that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium do not apply to such specifications, except
for very restrictive geographical distributions of the (potential) consumer base. Similar
difficulties in the application of the Caplin-Nalebuff existence conditions arise when the
utility functions involve other attributes that depend jointly on the firm/customer type
combination, for example brand loyalty characteristics; see Section 3.
We identify a simple and very broadly satisfied condition under which a Nash equilib-
rium exists and that the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the solutions of the system
of FOC equations, a property of essential importance to empirical studies. This condition
specifies that in every market segment, each firm captures less than 50% of the potential
customer population when pricing at a level which, under the condition, can be shown
to be an upper bound for a rational price choice for the firm irrespective of the prices
chosen by its competitors. Moreover, we show that under a somewhat stronger, but still
broadly satisfied version of the above condition, a unique equilibrium exists.
Finally, while the above results characterize the equilibrium behavior for all but heav-
ily concentrated markets we complete the picture, giving a condition for the existence
of a Nash equilibrium, indeed a unique Nash equilibrium, for markets with an arbitrary
degree of concentration: The condition specifies that, the maximum feasible price vec-
tor falls below a given upper bound. In other words, to guarantee that a market with
an arbitrary degree of concentration has a (unique) Nash equilibrium, sufficiently tight
exogenous price limits must prevail while no such limits are needed when (one of) the
above market concentration condition(s) applies. Another important distinction is that
under the price limit condition, the equilibrium may reside at the boundary of the fea-
sible price region and therefore fails to satisfy the FOC equations. A counterexample
shows that if neither a very high level of market concentration can be excluded, nor the
feasible price region sufficiently confined, no Nash equilibrium may exist for the price
competition model. We also discuss the implications of these results for econometricians
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both in settings where a specific price vector is observed and assumed to be the (or an)
equilibrium, and those where neither the model parameters nor a price equilibrium is
observed.
Our class of MMNL models generalizes the class of models treated in the seminal pa-
per by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), itself a generalization of many existing models in the
industrial organization literature. In particular, along with a similar utility measure for
the outside option, our MMNL model is based on postulating a utility function for each
product and market segment which consists of three parts: the first component is an arbi-
trary function of the product’s non-price attributes and the non-income related customer
characteristics in the given market segment. The second term captures the joint impact
of the product’s price and the customer’s income level via a general product dependent
price-income sensitivity function of both, merely assumed to be concave decreasing in
the price variable. The third and final term denotes a random utility component with
an extreme value distribution as in standard Multinomial Logit models. Our structure
generalizes that in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) in two ways: First, Caplin and Nalebuff
specify the first term in the utility functions as a weighted average of the non-price related
product attributes, with each customer type or market segment characterized by a unique
vector of weights. Second, their price-income sensitivity function is specified as a concave
function of the difference of the customer’s income and the product’s price, as opposed
to our general function of income and price. Perhaps most importantly, Caplin and Nale-
buff require that the distribution of population sizes across the different customer types
satisfies specific (ρ-concavity) properties which are violated in many applications. We
impose no restrictions on this distribution.
As in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), we start with the assumption that each firm sells
a single product and that all customers share the same income level. Settings with
an arbitrary income distribution and those where the firms offer an arbitrary number of
products are covered in our Extensions Section 3.5. (As far as the former is concerned, we
show that our results continue to apply as long as the price-income sensitivity functions
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are separable into an income and a price-dependent function.)
Characterization of the equilibrium behavior in price competition models with MMNL
demand functions has remained a formidable challenge because the firms’ profit functions
fail, in general, to have any of the standard structural properties under which the ex-
istence of an equilibrium can be established. For example, the profit functions fail to
be quasi-concave. (When firms offer multiple products, this quasi-concavity property is
absent, even in a pure rather than a mixed MNL model, as shown by Hanson and Martin
(1996), exhibiting a counterexample in a 3-product monopolist model with logit demand
functions.)
Our approach is to (i) identify a compact region in the feasible price space on which the
profit functions are quasi-concave in the firm’s own price(s), or one in which they possess
the so-called single point crossing property, discussed in Section 3.3; this guarantees the
existence of an equilibrium in the restricted price region. We then establish that (ii) the
equilibria identified with respect to the restricted region continue to be equilibria in the
full price region and (iii) that no equilibria exist outside the identified restricted price
region.
1.5 The impact of horizontal mergers and acquisi-
tions in price competition models
Fundamental to our understanding of competitive dynamics in an oligopolistic industry
is the question of what impact mergers and acquisitions have on key equilibrium perfor-
mance measures. These include the aggregate profits of the merging firms, those of the
other firms in the industry (hereafter referred to as the “remaining firms”), equilibrium
prices, and consumer welfare.
Early strategy works, for example Steiner (1975), postulate that mergers should in-
crease aggregate profits of the merging firms, even in the absence of any cost efficiencies
resulting from economies of scope or scale. It was also conjectured that horizontal merg-
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ers should result in an increase in equilibrium prices, for all of the products offered by the
industry. This was assumed, for example, in the classical paper by Williamson (1968).
However, early attempts to substantiate these conjectures on the basis of industrial or-
ganization models failed. For example, Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1982), Salant et al.
(1983), and Davidson and Deneckere (1984) all concluded from their analyses that aggre-
gate profits of merging firms actually decline, unless accompanied with significant cost
efficiencies due to synergies or economies of scope. At first sight, this appears counterin-
tuitive, since the merged firm always has the option to maintain the (quantity) decisions
pertaining to the pre-merger equilibrium and improve on these to achieve higher aggre-
gate profits. However, the dynamics in the competition models analyzed by the above
authors are such that the new post-merger equilibrium is associated with lower aggregate
profits.
A seminal step toward resolving this enigma was provided by Deneckere and Davidson
(1985). These authors explained that the counterintuitive findings in the prior literature
were the result of analyzing the question in the context of Cournot competition models,
in which firms select sales quantities or targets as opposed to prices. The authors pro-
ceeded to show that, under price (Bertrand) competition, the anticipated effects can be
demonstrated: In the absence of cost efficiencies resulting from a merger, aggregate prof-
its of the merging firms increase as do equilibrium prices. Even the equilibrium profits
of the remaining firms in the industry increase, while the consumer ends up holding the
bag, i.e., consumer welfare declines. Their analysis is based on a model with completely
symmetric firms and linear demand and cost functions. This model was first proposed
by Shubik and Levitan (1980). In their appendix, Deneckere and Davidson extend the
results to competition models with non-linear demand functions satisfying five assump-
tions, the most important of which is that the industry is symmetrically differentiated,
i.e., all firms share the same constant marginal procurement cost rate and the demand
for any pair of products is identical when both its own price and those of the competitors
are the same.
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In this essay, we establish the above conjectures for general price competition models
with general non-linear demand and cost functions as long as the models are super-
modular, with two additional structural conditions: (i) each firm’s profit function is
strictly quasi-concave in its own price(s), and (ii) markets are competitive, i.e., in the
pre-merger industry, each firm’s profits increase when any of his competitors increases
his price, unilaterally. In particular, we show that in the absence of cost synergies, both
the component-wise smallest and largest post-merger price equilibrium are larger than
their pre-merger counterparts, implying reduced consumer welfare. (The existence of
a component-wise smallest and largest equilibrium follows from the fact that both the
pre-merger and post-merger competition models are supermodular.) In addition, the
post-merger equilibrium profit of the merged firm exceeds the pre-merger aggregate equi-
librium profits of the merging firms. Perhaps most surprisingly, even the equilibrium
profits of the remaining firms increase. (In the case of multiple equilibria, all of these
comparison results pertain both to the largest and smallest equilibrium.) These results
have been conjectured to hold for general supermodular price competition models, see
for example the influential survey chapters by Whinston (2006, 2007).
We establish our results, at first, for settings where each firm in the industry offers a
single product; we then generalize them to industries with general multi-product firms.
We also derive conditions under which cost synergies, by themselves, result in lower
equilibrium prices and discuss how the combined effect of increased market concentration
and cost synergies can be assessed efficiently.
The results in this essay are of interest to individual firms competing in an oligopoly
and either considering a merger or wishing to evaluate the consequences of a potential
merger by others. They are also of interest to government agencies such as the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
As discussed in detail, in Section 5, these agencies are charged with the task of evalu-
ating all proposed mergers and acquisitions of firms with a capital value (or so-called
“transaction value”) exceeding an annually adjusted threshold, more than a thousand
15
proposals annually. The DOJ and FTC initially focused on relatively simple market
concentration measures such as the (post-merger) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
to assess the potential for a “substantial lessening of competition in the industry,” the
standard prescribed by the Clayton and Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. However, economists
have pointed out, repeatedly, that, in particular in the case of differentiated products,
these market concentration measures are poor surrogates for the actual changes in equi-
librium prices, consumer welfare, and firm profits. As a consequence, As a consequence,
the DOJ and FTS have, since the early nineties, conducted merger simulations when
mergers in differentiated product markets are proposed. Here, an oligopoly model for
the industry is estimated and a pre- and post-merger equilibrium computed, see Werden
and Froeb (1994, 1996), and Werden (1997). The merger simulation approach was also
widely adopted by other economists (, outside of the DOJ and FTC,) for example Baker
and Bresnahan (1985), Berry and Pakes (1993), Hausman et al. (1994), Hausman and
Leonard (1999), Nevo (2000a), Dube (2005), and Thomadsen (2005a).
The results in our essay provide important support for these merger simulations. In
the above described class of supermodular price competition models, we are able to show
that, if the pre-merger industry has a unique equilibrium, the post-merger smallest equi-
librium can be computed by applying a simple tatônnement scheme with the pre-merger
price vector as the starting point. Moreover, this scheme generates an increasing sequence
of price vectors which converges to the post-merger equilibrium. (The post-merger small-
est and largest equilibrium can also be computed by applying a tatônnement scheme,
with the smallest and largest feasible price vector as its starting point, respectively; these
schemes are monotone as well.)
16
Chapter 2
How much is a reduction of your
customers’ wait worth? An
empirical study of the fast-food
drive-thru industry based on
structural estimation methods.
We refer to Section 1.3 for an introduction and summary of the models and estimation
techniques used in this chapter. Recall the following series of research questions:
1. Does the customer’s waiting time at the fast-food drive-thru lane represent a sig-
nificant determinant of consumer choices and resulting market shares, as believed
by the industry and operations management literature alike?
2. When comparing the demand sensitivity to waiting time and price differentials, is
the implied value of time of the same order of magnitude as the average wage or
income earned per hour? If not, is it of a larger or smaller order of magnitude?
3. Can the above stated industry maxim be substantiated by empirical estimates? In
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particular, when taking into account that the various outlets are likely to adjust
their prices in response to reduced waiting time standards, adopting a new price
equilibrium, does the maxim hold?
4. Furthermore, this maxim expresses the belief that a given waiting time reduction is
equally valuable for all chains in terms of resulting increases in market shares and
sales. Plausible consumer choice models may imply that these benefits, in fact, vary
with the initial market shares of the chains, either in a robustly predictable way or
one that depends on the specific parameter estimates. Either way, it is important to
understand to what extent these benefits vary with the size of the chain and other
chain attributes. In addition, do the increases in market shares accrue primarily
from customers switching between chains or from the acquisition of new customers
to the fast-food market?
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 provides a review of the relevant lit-
erature. Section 2.2 develops our consumer choice and competition model. Section 2.3
describes the many data sources employed and the approach we adopted to collect the
data. Section 2.4 is devoted to a description of the GMM estimation technique as applied
to our model. Section 2.5 describes the estimation results and counterfactual studies.
Finally, Section 2.6 completes the essay with a discussion of possible extensions.
2.1 Literature Review
The literature on competition in service industries dates back to the late 1970s. Luski
(1976) and Levhari and Luski (1978) were the first to model competition between service
providers. The latter paper addresses a duopoly where each of the firms acts as an M/M/1
system, with exogenous and identical service rates. In this model, customers select their
service provider strictly on the basis of the full price, defined as the direct price plus
the expected steady state waiting time multiplied with the waiting time cost rate. The
question whether a price equilibrium exists in this model remained an open question,
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until it was recently resolved in the affirmative by Chen and Wan (2003), albeit for for
the basic model with a uniform cost rate. These authors show, however, that the Nash
equilibrium may fail to be unique. More recent variants of the Levhari and Luski models
include Li and Lee (1994), Armony and Haviv (2001) and Wang and Olsen (2008).
Cachon and Harker (2002) and So (2000) analyzed the first models in which customers
consider criteria beyond the lowest full price when choosing a service provider (e.g., qual-
ity). Both confined themselves, again, to M/M/1 service providers. Allon and Federgruen
(2007, 2006) treat the price and waiting time standard as completely independent firm
attributes which different customers may trade off in different ways. Nevertheless, Allon
and Federgruen (2007) confines itself to systems of demand rates that are linear in the
prices and to M/M/1 service providers, while Allon and Federgruen (2006) studies more
general demand models, such as attraction models, and allows for more general queueing
facilities. We refer to these two papers as well as Hassin and Haviv (2003) for additional
references of service competition models. Another stream of papers, in particular Hall
and Porteus (2000) and Gans (2002), models the competition between services providers
selecting a distribution for the (non-congestion related) quality of service, based on spe-
cific consumer choice models. Gans et al. (2007) describes an empirical study to test
these models with laboratory experiments, as opposed to econometric field studies.
Many service processes are provided via call centers. Here, customers are known to
be very sensitive to their waiting times, which is why such centers are designed and
staffed to meet specific service level agreements (SLAs), see Hasija et al. (2007) for a
recent survey of such agreements. However, virtually all planning models in the vast
literature related to call centers assume that demand processes are exogenous inputs, or,
at best, dependent on service charges. We refer to Gans et al. (2003) for an excellent
tutorial on call center management. When describing future challenges in this area, the
authors emphasize “a better understanding of customer behavior” (§7.3) and the need to
model and estimate “multiple levels of equilibria”. Beyond these levels, we suggest the
desirability of models incorporating the competitive effect of service levels provided by
19
the call centers of competing service providers.
The above reviewed literature is based on the observation that firms compete along
the service level dimension as well as anecdotal and empirical evidence that customers
value waiting time when making decisions regarding their preferred service provider. One
example in the fast-food industry is F and Vollmann (1990) examining consumer choice
criteria with a sample of 723 customers who were asked to rank their satisfaction with var-
ious aspects of the delivery process. The authors established that the satisfaction scores
were highly correlated with the experienced waiting time. Time of day, store location,
and whether the customer was at work or school were important factors determining the
strength of the waiting time sensitivity. Day of week and participation activities other
than work around the meal (e.g., shopping, visiting friends) were not significant.
This empirical study complements the earlier quoted plethora of trade literature doc-
umenting the centrality of waiting times in this industry. Our study complements the
theoretical literature on competition models by estimating the parameters used and as-
sumed by these models. There have been very few other works which attempt to estimate
these parameters. The two empirical studies investigating questions closest to our own
are Deacon and Sonstelie (1985) and Png and Reitman (1994). The former appears to
have been the first to estimate the impact price differentials and average waiting times
have on sales volumes; however, the setting is one where prices are exogenously deter-
mined by government price controls, avoiding the endogeneity challenge inherent in most
studies including our own. The selected estimation method is based on a probit model,
applicable in the case of two firms only. The model does not apply to settings with price
selecting firms or those where customer choices depend on factors other than the full
price. Png and Reitman (1994) describes the peak hour sales in a market of 1501 gas sta-
tions in four Massachusetts counties via a system of demand equations. These equations
are not derived from an underlying consumer choice model as, for example, in Deacon
and Sonstelie (1985) or our essay. In the absence of actual observations of the waiting
times or the peak hour sales volumes, the authors specify the logarithm of a firm’s (peak
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hour) sales volume as a linear function of the logarithm of the firm’s own price, that of
the average of the prices of the “nearby” stations, a vector of station attributes, and a
proxy for the average waiting time. The latter is postulated as the ratio of the peak hour
sales volume and a predetermined power of the number of pumps, while the peak hour
sales volume is assumed to be given by the aggregate weekly sales divided by a given
power of the number of operating hours. The coefficients in this model are assumed to
be homogeneous constants which are estimated via a Least Squares Regression method.
The authors address the problem of the explanatory prices and capacity variables be-
ing endogenous to the system, by the use of a two stage least squares method, invoking
instrumental variables claimed to be uncorrelated with the error terms.
The transportation research literature has often specified the demand for alternative
transportation modes as arising from a mixed multinomial logit model with prices and
travel times as explanatory variables, similar to our essay. However, the maximum likeli-
hood estimations typically employed are challenged by the above mentioned endogeneity
problems; see Hess et al. (2005) for a recent example, estimating the implicit cost asso-
ciated with travel time to be in excess of $100/hr. Finally, an earlier economics paper
by De Vany et al. (1983) estimated the effect waiting times have on patient volumes
in dentist offices; ignoring the impact of competition and employing OLS, the authors
obtain a statistically significant positive value for the waiting time sensitivity, perhaps
because in their setting demand is relatively inelastic with respect to waiting times while
capacity is inflexible. In contrast, we estimate the impact of waiting times, prices, geo-
graphic dispersion, chain attributes, and demographic factors on demand. Our approach
follows the work by Bresnahan (1987), Berry (1994), Berry et al. (1995). These authors
demonstrate how to estimate consumer choice models and cost structures in oligopolistic
markets with differentiated goods using aggregate consumer level data and structural
models of competition. The general approach posits a distribution of consumer prefer-
ences for the competing goods based on their attributes. The preferences are aggregated
into a market level demand system that, when combined with assumptions on cost and
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price-setting behavior, allows one to estimate the parameters.
In the above papers, market shares are observed. Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) were
the first to demonstrate how this estimation framework can be used in the absence of
quantity data. As mentioned in the introduction, we face the same challenge since in the
fast-food industry, sales data are not reported and are treated as strategic and proprietary
information.
More recent work by Davis (2006) and Thomadsen (2005a) incorporated geography
in the BLP framework. Thomadsen (2005a) studies the impact of ownership structure
on prices in the fast-food industry. The author uses this method to establish that the
impact of mergers in such an industry can be large, but the impact of mergers decreases
as the merging outlets are further apart. Our consumer choice model adds the waiting
time measure to the set of outlet and chain-dependent explanatory variables employed
in Thomadsen (2005a) but does not include ownership structure. For reasons explained
in the model section, we incorporate other chain attributes that act as indicators of
perceived quality, instead of the chain dummy variables employed in Thomadsen (2005a)
Our study is also related to the recent empirical literature in operations management.
To our knowledge, most of this literature focuses on consumer products rather than
services. See Olivares and Cachon (2009) and Musalem et al. (2009) for surveys of this
literature. Notable exceptions include Olivares et al. (2008) and Diwas and Terwiesch
(2009a,b) which focus on the health care industry.
2.2 The Model
In this section we develop the competition model representing the competitive interdepen-
dencies and interactions among the outlets in our geographic region. The model combines
two sub-models: (a) a consumer choice model which determines how many of the region’s
residents and commuters choose, for any given lunch or dinner meal, to go to a fast-food
establishment and, among those, how many select a specific outlet, and (b) a model to
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represent the variable cost structure of the different outlets as a function of their sales
volume and service level (i.e., its waiting time standard). Combining the two sub-models
permits us to derive the outlets’ profit functions. As explained, in the fast-food industry,
waiting time standards are selected by the chains. However, price decisions are relegated
to the independent outlets, if for no other reason than to avoid illegal forms of price
fixing. As franchising became popular in the sixties, the US courts began to limit the
types of pricing restrictions chains can impose on their franchises. Only maximum retail
prices have become legal, under certain conditions, based on the Supreme Court ruling
in State Oil vs. Khan (1997). (In the prior thirty years, even maximum price levels had
been illegal, see Albrecht vs. Herald (1968).)
When collecting data, we called the chains for price recommendations that they may
give to their franchisees. Consistent with the Supreme Court rulings, we were told that
the practice of suggesting prices to the outlets is illegal. Indeed, we have observed signifi-
cant price differences among outlets of the same chain, see Table 2.2 in Section 2.3. Thus,
waiting time standards are selected centrally by the chains but prices are chosen by the
individual outlets. We can, therefore, assume that the prices observed in the market rep-
resent the equilibrium in a price competition model, under given waiting time standards
specified by the chains operating in the selected geographical region. We show that this
price equilibrium model has an equilibrium which is a solution of a non-linear system of
equations. It is this system of equations which permits us to estimate the parameters
that describe the consumer choice model and associated demand functions, as well as the
parameters in the cost structure.
2.2.1 The Consumer Choice Model
Demand for fast-food meals at each outlet is specified by a discrete choice model. Con-
sumers choose either to purchase a specific lunch or dinner meal from one of the fast-food
outlets or to consume an outside good. Consumers assign a utility value to each outlet,
as well as to the no-purchase option, specified as a linear function of the price, waiting
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time, distance, chain identity of the outlet, and various demographic factors including the
consumer’s gender, race, age bracket and occupational status. Each of these utility equa-
tions contains an additional random noise term. It is natural to assume that customers
make their choices in two stages: (i) they first decide whether to dine at a fast-food out-
let as opposed to alternatives, such as eating at home or a different type of restaurant,
and (ii) assuming the first question is answered in the affirmative, which of the various
outlets in the region to patronize. We model the two stage choice process by assuming
that the (potential) customer attributes a utility value to the no-purchase option which
depends on her demographic attributes. The customer also assigns a utility value to each
of the outlets in the region that depends on attributes of both the outlet and the chain
it belongs to. The customer purchases a meal at one of the fast-food outlets if and only
if the highest of the outlets’ utility values is in excess of that of the no-purchase option;
in this case the meal is consumed at the outlet with the highest utility value.
Formally, the conditional indirect utility of consumer i from fast-food outlet j is
specified as follows:
Ui,j = β +X
′
k(j)ζ − δDij − γPj − αWk(j) + ηij, (2.1)
where k(j) denotes the chain k to which outlet j belongs, Xk(j) is a column vector of
observed properties of the chain to which outlet j belongs, Dij is the distance between
consumer i and outlet j, Pj is the price of a (standard) meal at outlet j, Wk(j) is the
waiting time standard (= average steady-state waiting time in system) of chain k(j)
associated with outlet j, ηij is the portion of the utility of individual i at outlet j which
is unobserved by the modeler, and (α, β, γ, δ, ζ) represents a parameter string with ζ an
array of the same dimension as X.
Our estimation of waiting time sensitivity is based on three assumptions: (i) con-
sumers make purchasing decisions based on the steady state waiting time distribution at
an outlet, not on the prevailing queue length (the only varying observable characteristic)
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at the time of arrival (ii) consumers characterize the steady state waiting time distri-
bution by its average and (iii) all outlets belonging to the same chain share the same
waiting time distribution. The first assumption is based on our understanding that in
most cases consumers make their selection before traveling to any specific outlet based
on the “average” experience. The second assumption is not inherent to our approach and
could easily be replaced by other characteristics of the steady state waiting time distri-
bution such as the 95th percentile. As for the final assumption, we explained earlier that
in the fast-food industry the chains select and announce, to their franchisees, a common
waiting time standard for all of their outlets, implemented with tight process prescrip-
tion and control. Indeed, chains achieve remarkably uniform average waiting times at
their franchises1. Industry trade organizations such as Quick Service Restaurant (QSR),
publicize yearly surveys of the average waiting time experienced at the various fast-food
chains. Outlet specific samples in our waiting time data set are too small to make our
own empirical verifications of assumption (iii). Furthermore, although there are empirical
papers which have individual waiting time observations for a single outlet or chain in a
service industry, such a data set is extremely difficult to obtain for industry-wide studies.
Since all outlets belonging to the same chain share the same waiting time standard,
it is important to include in the individual utility functions (2.1) any other observable
chain-wide attributes which (i) are correlated with the waiting time standard and (ii)
may plausibly serve as a quality indicator for the chain. The only such attributes we
were able to identify are the density of the chain network (, as measured by the number
of outlets,) in the county and the intensity of the chain’s advertising efforts, as quantified
by its aggregate national advertising spending. We do not use chain identity indicator
variables, as is frequently done, because its inclusion among the explanatory variables in
(2.1) results in an identification problem 2.
1In 2006 Jim Hyatt, Burger King’s VP and COO, stated that the average waiting time at its 6,900
domestic franchises cover a very narrow range from 165 to 170 seconds, while this average waiting time
was reduced by 22 seconds, compared to the previous year. (See Jargon (2006))
2Normalizing the coefficient of one of the chain indicator variables removes collinearity in the utility
function; however market shares remain invariant to a common additive shift in the coefficients of the
indicator variables and that of the waiting time standard.
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A recent QSR-commissioned study, Frank N Magid Associates (2010), reports on a
survey among 1,120 drive-thru customers, in which each respondent was asked to list
which of ten attributes makes the drive-thru experience the best. The most frequently
cited attribute was “speed - wait time of drive-thru service” (22% of respondents), fol-
lowed by “price” and “order accuracy” (12% each). Location was listed almost as fre-
quently as “price” (and order accuracy), i.e., by 11% of respondents. Our consumer
choice model represents all of these attributes with the exception of “order accuracy”;
the latter should be included in future studies, in particular as it may shed light on an
optimal balance between “speed of service” and “order accuracy”.
We assume that for every outlet j, the random components of {ηij} represent non-
systematic unobservable variations in the perceived utility of the outlet among potential
customers of the same demographic type residing or working in the same location. We
therefore assume that the {ηij} variables are i.i.d. Random utility models of type (2.1) of-
ten contain an additional outlet specific component ξj, j = 1, ..., N , to address systematic
attributes of the firm (outlet), known to the firms and customers but not to the modeler.
As argued in Thomadsen (2005a), in the case of the fast-food drive-thru industry, this
term may be omitted because other than through price and location, different outlets
belonging to the same chain offer close to identical attributes. At the same time, as ex-
plained above, all relevant chain specific attributes are captured by the chain variables X
in the first term in (2.1)3, along with the waiting time standard W . The indirect utility
associated with the no-purchase option is given by
Ui,0 = β0 +Miπ + ηi,0. (2.2)
Here, Mi is a row vector specifying the consumer’s age, gender, race, and whether they
3Thomadsen (2005a, p915) states: “not only is the food identical, but the chains also try to make the
experiences at each of their outlets identical. For example, their outlets have a uniform appearance, their
menu boards look very similar, and their workers wear similar uniforms.” See Anonymous (2006) for one
of many industry publications reporting on the same uniformity in the customer experience. “Wendy’s
ensures that customers who go to a Wendy’s in Wisconsin will have the same experience as those who
visit a store in Shanghai.”
26
are making the decision as a commuter or resident (i.e., people are allowed to have a
different preference for the outside good when they are at work versus at home). If the
age distribution is characterized by A age classes, the Mj vector is a binary vector of
dimension (A+2): for l = 1, ..., A − 1,Mil = 1 if consumer i belongs to the lth age
bracket and 0 otherwise, similarly, for l = A,A+1, and A+2,Mil = 1(0) if the consumer
is female (male), African American (white), and a resident (worker), respectively. β0
and π represent another set of parameters to be estimated and ηi0 denotes the unknown
portion of the utility of individual i for the non-purchase option. Once again, the random
components {ηi0} are i.i.d.
We consider a limited number of age brackets. Therefore, there is a finite list of
{1, . . . ,M} of consumer-types, combining age, gender, race and occupational status. In
view of the importance of the distances between the consumer and the various outlets,
we partition our geographic region into a grid of very small sub-areas B = {1, . . . , B}
and assume all consumers residing in a sub-area are located at the sub area’s centroid.
(In our study, we use tracts, as defined by the U.S. Census, with an average area of 1.2
square miles in Cook county.) Thus, all potential consumers residing in a given sub-area
b ∈ B and belonging to a given demographic group m ∈M , share the same mean utility
value for all outlets and the no-purchase option.
Assuming the distributions of the random noise terms, {ηij : j = 0, . . . , J}, are
Gumbel (or doubly exponential) with common scale parameter µ, and assuming every
consumer selects the alternative with the highest utility value, this gives rise to the
following multinomial logit model in which each outlet’s market share for each tract and
demographic group is given by the following expression:











j = 1, . . . , J ; b = 1, . . . , B;m = 1, . . . ,M. (2.3)
Without loss of generality, we express the utility levels in units such that the scale
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parameter µ = 1. Also, the consumer choices only depend on the relative ranking of
the utility values for the different outlets and the no-purchase option; they are therefore
invariant to a common additive shift. This permits us to normalize the intercept β in the
utility function (2.1) to β = 0.
Multiplying the market shares with h(b,m), the number of consumers of demographic
group m, residing in or commuting to geographic region b allows us to specify expected
aggregate sales in an outlet as a function of the various parameters θ ≡ {ζ, δ, γ, α, π} in
the utility equations:





h(b,m)Sj,b,m(P,W,X|ζ, δ, γ, π, ). (2.4)
2.2.2 The Outlets’ Cost Structure
When assessing the impact of operational measures, it is important to specify a cost
structure which is rigorously substantiated by an adequate operational model. We have
selected a structure, in which an outlet’s costs, expressed as a function of its expected
sales volume, is affine with an intercept that is proportional with the reciprocal of the
waiting time standard:
Cj(Qj) = c̄jQj + d̄j/Wk(j) = (ck(j) + εj)Qj + [dk(j) + uj]/Wk(j), j = 1, . . . , J. (2.5)
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Here, for every outlet j = 1, ..., J and chain k = 1, ..., K:
Jk = the set of outlets belonging to chain k, i.e., Jk = {j : k(j) = k}
ck(j) = the average variable food, labor and equipment cost rate
per customer for an outlet of chain k,
dk(j) = the average variable capacity cost rate for an outlet of chain k,
εj = a noise term, denoting the difference between outlet j’s variable cost rate c̄j and
the norm or average for this chain ck(j),
uj = a noise term, denoting the difference between outlet j’s variable capacity cost rate d̄j
and the norm or average for this chain dk(j).
Each outlet’s marginal cost rate, as well as the capacity cost rate, is equal to a common
chain-specific cost plus a zero-mean, unobserved outlet-specific component. This speci-
fication is supported by the franchisers’ effort to create a uniform customer experience
across their outlets, via standardization of the equipment, as well as the preparation
process and food components used at each of its outlets. The unobserved shock to the
cost rate comes from outlet specific conditions(e.g., deficiencies in labor productivity,
management efficiency, or smaller kitchens creating crowding and reduced efficiency).
The affine cost structure in (2.5) arises in several queueing models which may describe
the service process of an outlet. For example, the structure in (2.5) arises in an M/M/1
system, where the waiting time standard W denotes the expected total sojourn time in
the drive-thru queue and the variable capacity cost is assumed to be proportional with
the service rate. More realistically, a fast-food service process could be represented as a
Jackson (queueing) network. A food order may travel along a path of service stages, from
order taking to the cooking of the hamburgers, assembly of the cooked burgers with the
side dish and required drink and back to the drive-thru counter. Allon and Federgruen
(2006) have shown that the cost structure in (2.5) applies to a general Jackson network,
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assuming the variable capacity costs are proportional with the service rates installed at
the various nodes of the network. Alternatively, the service process may be best described
as a GI/GI/s system, with an arbitrary renewal arrival process, arbitrary service time
distribution and a team of s parallel servers. If the consumer is particularly focused on the
delay experienced in the drive-thru queue and if W denotes a given fractile of the delay
distribution, then the cost structure in (2.5) arises as a close approximation, see Allon
and Federgruen (2006). This identity is, in fact, exact, rather then an asymptotically
correct approximation when the service time distribution is exponential, i.e. in the case
of a GI/M/s system.
We refer to Allon and Federgruen (2006) for additional queueing models resulting
in affine cost structures of type (2.5). These authors also show that an even larger set
of queueing models give rise to a more complex family of cost functions. Our estima-
tion method, which fits the model parameters to the FOC of the underlying competition
model, can be adapted to this more general cost structure, see section 2.2.3 for more
discussion. However, Allon and Gurvich (2010) show that approximating a more com-
plex capacity function by an affine function results in only minor discrepancies in the
price equilibrium. Thus, disregarding higher order terms does not significantly alter the
outcomes of the market.
2.2.3 The Price Competition Model
We are now ready to analyze the price competition model which arises when all waiting
time standards have been specified. We assume that every outlet is independently owned.
However, our methodology is readily adapted if various outlets are jointly managed by
the same franchisee, see below. In view of (2.5),
πj(P,W,X, θ) = (Pj − c̄j)Qj(P,W,X|θ)− d̄j/Wk(j), j = 1, . . . , J (2.6)
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denotes firms j’s profit level as a function of all prices charged by the various outlets. Each
firm j selects its price within a given range [c̄j, pj,max]. It is a long standing conjecture
that a price competition model with a mixed multinomial logit demand function and an
affine cost structure has a unique interior point equilibrium which is the unique solution
of the system of equations given by the First Order Conditions (FOC):
Qj(P,W,X|θ) + (Pj − ck(j) − εj)
∂Qj(P,W,X|θ)
∂Pj
= 0, j = 1, . . . , J. (2.7)
This conjecture underlies almost all structural estimation methods in models with de-
mand equations of this type. Indeed, the essence of these estimation methods is to find
parameter combinations under which the FOC equations (2.7) are satisfied as closely as
possible since the competing firms are assumed to have adopted the observed price vector
as the (a) Nash equilibrium.
Unfortunately, little was known about whether or when the above conjecture holds,
see e.g., Berry et al. (1995) 4. In Chapter 3 we show that a Nash equilibrium exists
and that the set of equilibria corresponds with the set of solutions to (2.7), provided
once can ensure that no single firm attains an excessively large share of the market when
pricing at a specific level which, under the condition, is shown to be an upper bound for a
rational price choice. More specifically the authors introduce the following parameterized
condition:
C(µ) Each firm j captures, in each market segment, i.e., each tract/demographic group
combination (b,m) less than a fraction of the market when pricing at the level
p̄j = c̄j + 1/(1− µ)γ, j = 1, ..., N.
4For example, in their classical paper Berry et al. (1995) note: “We assume that a Nash equilibrium to
this pricing game exists, and that the equilibrium prices are in the interior of the firms’ strategy sets (the
positive orthant). While Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) provide a set of conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium for related models of single product firms, their theorems do not easily generalize to the multi
product case. However, we are able to check numerically whether our final estimates are consistent with
the existence of an equilibrium. Note that none of the properties of the estimates require uniqueness of
equilibrium, although without uniqueness it is not clear how to use our estimates to examine the effects
of policy and environmental changes.” Indeed in Chapter 3 we show that an equilibrium may fail to
exist in the general model without any parameter restrictions.
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A firm’s market share is, of course, maximized when its competitors adopt their maximum
price levels. (See Chapter 3 for sufficient conditions of C(µ) that are independent of the
choice of the {pmaxj }-values.) Under condition C(µ), Chapter 3 Lemma 3.4.1 shows, in
fact, that, for all j = 1, . . . , N the price level p̄j = c̄j+1/(1−µ)γ arises as an upper bound
for firm j’s price level. Of particular importance are conditions C(1/2) and C(1/3) which
ensure that no outlet captures more than 50% or 33% of the market, respectively (under
the above mentioned price levels). Conditions C(1/2) and C(1/3) are easily satisfied in
most industries and the fast-food industry, in particular. (See §2.5 for a verification).
Theorems 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 in Chapter 3, applied to our model, imply:
Theorem 2.2.1 (a) Under condition C(1/2), the price competition model has an equi-
librium which is an interior point of the price cube XNj=1[c̄j, c̄j + 2/γ]
(b) Under condition C(1/2) every Nash equilibrium is a solution to the FOC (2.7), and,
vice, versa, every solution to (2.7) is a Nash equilibrium.
(c) Under condition C(1/3), the price competition model has a unique equilibrium which
is an interior point of the price cube XNj=1[c̄j, c̄j + 1.5/γ]; this equilibrium is a solu-
tion to the FOC (2.7).
Given the affine cost structure (2.5) as substantiated in section 2.2.2 on the basis of
underlying queueing models, the waiting time measures impact only via the demand
model, i.e., via the marginal price sensitivities {∂Qj(P,W,X|θ)∂pj : j = 1, . . . , J}, see
(3), (4). As discussed in section 2.2.2 under more general queueing models, the marginal
costs become a function of the waiting time measures as well, in which case the vector W
impacts the structure of the FOC equations both via the demand and the supply model.
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2.3 Data
We have studied the hamburger drive-thru fast-food industry in Cook County, Illinois.
We have chosen this industry both because of the availability of data and because this
is an industry that has historically placed a premium on competing via its service levels.
The QSR magazine 2007 Drive-Thru Time Study notes that in 2007 all quick-service
chains made major efforts to improve speed-of-service in their drive-thrus, see Nuckolls
(2007). Examples of new technology improving speed-of-service include timer systems
that allow in-store managers as well as regional and national offices to monitor waiting
times at outlets and the outsourcing of drive-thru order taking. The 2008 QSR Drive-
Thru study reports that this trend is continuing, with the fastest chain, Wendy’s, shaving
off an additional seven seconds from the average waiting time in the previous year. There
is a plethora of anecdotal evidence that the industry is reacting to consumer expectations
regarding waiting times. For example, the same 2007 QSR Drive-Thru study reported
that 70% of surveyed customers said speed is an important factor in the drive-thru ex-
perience.
We believe that for our purposes, Cook County is representative of all urban/suburban
counties in the country. The propensity to consume hamburger fast-food meals as opposed
to alternatives may differ on different parts of the country. However, we see no reason
why within urban/suburban areas, the relative trade offs between price, waiting times,
geography, and other chain attributes among those interested in a fast-food meal would
vary significantly.
We use as our data set, all fast-food outlets belonging to chains selling hamburgers
and with a presence of more than five outlets in the county. We consider only outlets
with drive-thru windows because outlets without drive-thru windows tend to be located
in places such as malls and airports where consumers are facing a different set of con-
siderations. This results in a total of 388 outlets belonging to McDonald’s (173), Burger
King (92), Wendy’s (62), White Castle (42), Dairy Queen (10), and Steak ’n Shake (9).
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Our consumer choice model does not differentiate among the various items on the
outlets’ menus. Our model choice is based on the assumption that consumers when
trading off different outlets (, as well as the no purchase option,) consider a general
price assessment about each restaurant rather than a complete comparison of all fully
itemized menus, information they are unlikely to possess let alone be able to aggregate
in a comprehensive trade-off among alternative outlets. We have demonstrated that this
trade-off requires the consideration of waiting time, geography and chain attributes along
with the general price level. As a proxy for the general price level of a hamburger drive-
thru restaurant we have computed the price of a “standard meal” consisting of: the
franchise’s signature burger, a small fries order, and a small soft-drink. (We gathered
prices by calling each location.) The type of burger selected was standardized by weight
and in the case of White Castle, which sells small burgers, we use the price for four
sliders. As noted in the introduction to Section 2.2, we have observed very significant
price differences among outlets belonging to the same chain, with the most expensive
McDonald’s or Burger King outlet being about 50% more expensive than the cheapest
outlet of that chain in the county, see Table 2.2.
Recall that, in the absence of data on joint ownership among franchises, we assume
each outlet is owned independently, or, at least, operating as an independent profit center
5. The only exception among the six chains in our study is White Castle all of whose
outlets are owned by the chain. Since all of the outlets sell similar products, i.e. ham-
burgers, and use the same means of service, i.e. drive thru facilities, we assume that all
of these outlets compete with each other as alternative producers in the same market.
We use two chain attributes, in addition to the chains’ waiting time standard, as
potential indicators of the consumer’s perception of chain quality: (1) the density of the
chain network measured by the number of outlets in Cook County, and (2) the “intensity”
5Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) have documented that in the state of Texas, there is a limited amount
of joint ownership among franchisees. The median number of outlets that a given outlet shares ownership
with is 5 for McDonald’s and 7 for Burger King. In addition, the authors document that the larger chains
“allow multiple unit ownership to arise only via purchases of individual units. In this case, franchisees
must satisfy the chain that they can efficiently run their current set of units before being granted the
‘right to expand’.”
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of the chain’s advertising efforts, as measured by the national advertising spend. The
advertising spend was taken from the Ad$pender database using the “Total Ad Spend”
figure for the “General Promotion” category for each chain in 2005. All media outlets
were included (e.g., television, US Internet, radio, and print). As discussed, all chains
select and strive for a common waiting time standard among all of their outlets. In
addition, customers often frequent more than a single outlet of a chain and expect to
experience a similar service level, irrespective of the specific outlet they visit. We have
selected the average steady-state waiting time, defined as the time spent in the drive-
thru queue plus the service time, as the waiting time standard used in the consumer
choice model of Subsection 2.2.1. To arrive at the average waiting time standards for
the different chains, we have employed the QSR magazine’s 2005 Drive-Thru Time Study
Database, which we purchased from QSR. The database contains, for a national sample
of outlets, two random observations at lunch and at dinner time. We obtained each
chain’s average waiting time by averaging the recorded observations over all outlets that
belong to the relevant chains, nationwide. These national average waiting times vary
significantly across chains, with the worst performer being close to twice as slow as the
best performer, see Table 2.1 below. The chain-wide waiting time standards of the six
chains in our study have a mean of 225.92 seconds, a standard deviation of 38.21, and
a range of [173.34,269.45]. Using a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances on all
Table 2.1: Average Waiting Time as Determined from 2005 QSR Drive-Thru
Study
Chain Mean Wait (sec) # Outlets Nat’l Advertising Spend (’05)
WENDY’S 173.34 62 $360MM
BURGER KING 192.29 92 $265MM
MCDONALD’S 224.27 173 $638MM
DAIRY QUEEN 231.85 10 $56MM
STEAK’N SHAKE 264.3 9 $12.5MM
WHITE CASTLE 269.45 42 $12.5MM
the national waiting time observations we have verified that waiting time observations for
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the six different chains were indeed drawn from different distributions with the exception
of two pairs: McDonald’s & Dairy Queen and White Castle & Steak ’n Shake. (Note
from Table 2.1, that the mean waiting times are nearly identical within each of these two
pairs as well). This confirms that different chains offer systematically different waiting
time experiences to the consumer. The results of this analysis can be seen in Table A.1
in Appendix A.1.
Demographic and geographic information was gathered with a very fine granularity
at the so-called tract level. Tracts are geographic areas defined by the U.S. Census
Bureau to contain 2,500 to 8,000 people. Cook County consists of 1,343 tracts with an
average area of only 1.2 square miles. In urban areas a tract corresponds with a few city
blocks. The next smallest geographic area recognized by the U.S. Census, the so-called
block groups, are so small that some demographic data, such as race, cannot be reported
without revealing the exact household being discussed and hence are not available to the
public. We have considered the following age brackets: 0-9, 10-19, 20-39, 40-59, and 60+.
We considered African American and white consumers only because these are the racial
groups for which we had the necessary data for employing the macro moments discussed
in Section 6. As mentioned in Section 2.2, consumers are also differentiated based on
whether they are at work or home. As far as the residents in a tract are concerned,
we collected the number of people of each age bracket, race, and gender combination
from the 2000 U.S. Census data. As to the population working in each of the tracts, the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics reports the number of people commuting between
every tract pair. We aggregated the flow of workers into each tract in Cook County from
any originating tract (whether or not the originating tract was within Cook County).
Unlike the U.S. Census data, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics data are not broken
down by age, gender and race combinations, so, we estimated the population size for each
triplet combination by assuming the three demographic attributes are independent. If a
person lives and works in Cook County they are counted as two consumers. We do this
because such consumers have the potential to consume one meal (e.g., lunch) while at
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work and another meal (e.g. dinner) while at home. Distinguishing between commuters
and residents, two genders and two racial groups, as well as among five age brackets,
we have thus divided the population into 40 different demographic groups. The distance
from the consumer to each outlet is calculated as the distance between the restaurant and
the centroid of the tract in which the consumer is located. To compute these distances we
employed the ArcView Geographic Information System modeling and mapping software.
In addition to the independent variables, we collected data for the so-called instru-
ments used in the estimation method. As discussed in the next section, these are outlet
specific variables that we argue are correlated with one or more of the independent vari-
ables but not with the noise terms {εj : j = 1, ..., J} in the cost rates, i.e., the outlet
specific shock on chain-wide marginal cost. Following the recommendation in Thomadsen
(2005a), we have selected the following instrumental variables: V1j = the distance from
outlet j to the nearest outlet, V2j = the number of outlets within two miles of outlet j,
V3j = the population density in the tract to which outlet j belongs, and V4j = the worker
density in this tract. Table 2.2 shows summary statistics for these instruments as well as
the price variables.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Outlet Specific Data
Variable Name Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
McDonald’s Price ($) 4.96 0.25 4.20 6.09
Burger King Price ($) 4.85 0.28 3.63 5.39
Wendy’s Price ($) 4.75 0.20 4.27 5.24
White Castle Price ($) 4.46 0.09 4.23 4.78
Dairy Queen Price ($) 5.66 0.26 5.07 6.07
Steak n’ Shake Price ($) 4.99 0.36 4.67 5.84
Distance to Nearest Outlet (mi) 0.55 0.48 0.00 2.52
No. Outlets within 2 mi 5.93 2.54 1 14
Population Density (100K/sq mi) 0.09 0.09 1.71E-04 0.80
Worker Density (100K/sq mi) 0.04 0.05 1.33E-03 0.36
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2.4 Estimation
As mentioned in the introduction, the major hurdle when estimating the parameters of
the demand functions and the firms’ cost structure, is the lack of available demand data.
As explained, this challenge is not unique to the fast-food industry, but presents itself
in almost all service industries. Because of the unavailability of sales data, we employ a
technique that estimates the parameters on the basis of the system of (FOC) equations
(2.7) the solutions of which, by Theorem 2.2.1, coincide with the Nash equilibria of the
price competition model.
The equilibrium conditions (2.7) represent a system of equations which involve only
the observed price vector P , waiting time standards W , outlet attribute matrix X, and
distances {Dj,bj = 1, . . . , J, b = 1, . . . , B}, as well as the unknown parameter string
and cost rate residuals. (In particular, the system of equations does not involve the
unobservable sales volumes.) The system of equations (2.7) allows us to determine the
cost rate residual as closed form functions of the observed explanatory variables and














In matrix notation, the equilibrium conditions (2.7) can be stated as:
Q(P,X,W ) + Ω(P − c̄) = 0, (2.10)
where Ω is a diagonal J × J matrix whose j-th diagonal element Ωj,j = ∂Qj∂Pj
6. For any
choice of the parameters θ′ = (ζ ′, γ′, δ′, π′, α′) the corresponding vector of cost rates can
thus be determined in closed form:
c̄ = P + Ω(P,X,W |θ)−1Q(P,X,W |θ). (2.11)
6When multiple outlets are owned by the same franchisee, the first order conditions continue to be of
the form (2.11), however with a non-diagonal matrix Ω. See Thomadsen (2005a) for details.
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The cost rate residuals ε can then be determined for each outlet as the difference of the






c̄j′ , εj = c̄j − ck(j), ∀j = 1 . . . J. (2.12)
One might be tempted to estimate the unknown parameters from (2.11) with the help
of standard maximum likelihood methods. However, such methods require a choice of
the specific unconditional distributions for the cost rate noise terms ε. Moreover, because
of the endogeneity of the price vector P , these variables are correlated with the noise
terms, so that all conditional distributions [εj|Pl : 1 ≤ j, l ≤ J ] need to be pre-specified
as well. Incorrect guesses for these various distributions, result in biased inferences, see
Hall (2005). The GMM technique overcomes both difficulties. See Nevo (2000b) and Hall
(2005) for clear expositions. It employs a vector of so-called instrument variables Zj which
are correlated with (some of) the explanatory variables {P,X,W,D}, but uncorrelated
with the cost rate noise terms ε, i.e., E[Zjεj] = 0 for all cost rates and all outlets.
Our instruments are based on the four instrumental variables V1j,V2j,V3j,V4j defined
in Section 2.3. In order to account for asymmetries in the way that different chains
are affected by these instrumental variables, we interact these variables with the chain
indicator vectors, Ik, k = 1, . . . , K, to arrive at a total of 24 instruments: for all j =
1, . . . , J, Zj is a (24x1) vector defined by Zj ≡ {Zl,k,j = Vlj ·Ikj, l = 1, . . . , 4, k = 1, . . . , K}.
Intuitively, these instruments affect demand by altering the strength of competition and
the size of the potential market. Moreover, they appear to be uncorrelated with the cost
rate differential an outlet is experiencing vis-a-vis the chain norm. Note that all of Cook
County is urban or suburban with a total land area of only 946 square miles. It therefore
faces a labor market with fairly uniform labor rates and skills. This implies that it is
very unlikely that any cost efficiencies or inefficiencies of any outlet compared to the
chain norm can be attributed to the population or worker density in its area. Had the
study been conducted on a nationwide level, the assumption of independence would be
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more questionable. Other than labor cost, the remaining variable costs in this industry
are associated with food, energy, and other process inputs which are tightly prescribed
by the chains. Outlets may face different real estate costs depending upon whether they
are in downtown Chicago as opposed to suburban areas: however, these differences affect
the outlets’ fixed costs rather than their variable costs. In other words, it is reasonable to
assume that the above stated orthogonality conditions apply. In view of the population




j=1 Zjεj(θ), of the vectors of random variables {Zjεj, j = 1, . . . , J} as close to
zero as possible. The GMM estimator computes a parameter vector θ̂ which minimizes a





The optimal weighting matrix for the GMM estimator has been shown to be the inverse
of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions. However, as
this matrix is not available a-priori, we follow the commonly used two-step estimation
procedure: in the first step, we use the GMM with weighting matrix A1 = I to get a
consistent initial estimator θ̂1 from (2.13). We then use θ̂1 to estimate the asymptotic
variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions, (E[G(θ̂1)G(θ̂1)
′]), and solve the
optimization problem (2.13) a second time with A2 = (E[G(θ̂1)G(θ̂1)
′])−1 as the weighting
matrix7.
There are well documented technical difficulties associated with optimization problem
(2.13). Its objective function has many local optima. In addition, there are large regions
where this function is close to flat, creating formidable difficulties for standard gradient
methods. As a consequence, we designed a specific optimization method, described in
Appendix A.2, and ran this algorithm with 20 different starting points.
While there are asymptotically accurate approximations for the variances of the pa-
7For a nice discussion of the two step method and a proof that the inverse of the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix is the optimal weighting matrix, see Hall (2005).
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rameter estimates, see e.g. Hall (2005), these are often known to perform badly (See
Brown and Newey (2002) and the 1996 special issue of the Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics quoted therein). Therefore, in order to validate the statistical signif-
icance of these estimates, we have constructed confidence intervals using a bootstrapping
procedure. This procedure is advocated when no sample data are available beyond those
used to obtain the estimate, see e.g. Brown and Newey (2002). The idea is to use subsets
of the sample and calculate the value of the estimators in each subset in order to estimate
the variance. To that end, we selected 80 random subsets of the tracts and ran the second
stage of the above algorithm on each subset, for all 20 starting points, resulting in a total
of 80 parameter vector estimates. Each subset has 134 tracts (10% of total number of
tracts). Eighty subsets were used because randomly selecting 80 out of 120 such subsets
consistently yielded similar confidence intervals. We used the empirical distribution to
construct the confidence intervals for each parameter.
We undertook two additional robustness tests for our estimates. To attempt to im-
prove the efficiency of our estimates, we supplemented the twenty-four micro-moments,
introduced in §5, with additional so-called macro-moments. Imbens and Lancaster (1994)
suggest supplementing micro-moments with macro-moments to increase the efficiency of
the estimates. This approach has been used in industrial organization studies by Petrin
(2002) and Davis (2006). See Appendix A.3 for a specification of the macro-moments. In
our second robustness check we ran the estimation using only subsets of the six chains
included in our base model. We ran the estimation once assuming that only the three
largest chains (McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger King) have a presence in the market
and a second time excluding the largest chain (McDonald’s) from the market.
2.5 Results
In this section, we report the results of the estimation process and robustness checks. We
use either the chain’s number of county outlets (OUT), the chain’s national advertising
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spend (ADV), or neither of these, as an additional chain attribute X in the utility function
(2.1). (The sensitivity to the ADV attribute was found to be statistically insignificant
when this attribute was added as the single X-variable. We have therefore omitted the
specification with both OUT and ADV as additional chain attributes.) We focus on the
key parameters of interest, emphasizing those that are statistically significant. Table
2.3 reports the estimated value of each of the main demand coefficients: price, waiting
time and distance sensitivity (γ, δ, α), as well as the sensitivity to the additional chain
attributes, if applicable. We report the estimates obtained by averaging all 20 two-stage
optimization solutions as well as their 95% confidence intervals8. The global optimum
among all 20 two-stage solutions is consisitenly close to the averages; for example, for the
preferred specification with OUT as an additional chain attribute, the gap is never larger
than 50%.
Table 2.3: Estimates of Consumer Sensitivity to Key Attributes Under 3 Model Specifi-
cationsb
Model Price Wait Time Distance Chain Proxy
Sens. ($) Sens. (sec.) Sens. (mi.) Sens.
No Brand 4.86E-01** 2.64E-02** 1.73E-01** NA
Proxy (0.450, 0.497) (2.65E-02, 2.93E-02) (0.127, 0.222) NA
Num. 4.92E-01** 2.37E-02** 8.24E-01** 1.39E-02**
Outlets (0.405, 0.500) (2.05E-02, 2.95E-02) (0.811, 1.26) (1.37E-02, 2.59E-02)
Advertising 4.92E-01** 2.34E-02** 9.15E-01** -5.55E-04
Sp. (0.412, 0.502) (1.65E-02, 2.99E-02) (0.869, 1.29) (-1.24E-02, 3.01E-03)
a** Indicates significance at the 99% confidence level. Significance level determined via a two-tail
test.
b** Indicates significance at the 99% confidence level. Significance level determined via a two-tail
test.
We first note that the estimates of the main parameters of interest, i.e., the sensitivity
parameters for price, waiting time, and distance (α, γ, δ), are remarkably consistent across
all three model specifications. This applies both to the point estimates and their 95%
8Three starting points yielded solutions with negative waiting time coefficients in all specifications
aside from that without a brand proxy so those three points were excluded when calculating the average
solution but not the bootstrapping procedure used to generate the confidence intervals.
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confidence intervals. (The only exception is the estimate of the distance sensitivitiy in
the model without the additional chain attribute X, which is approximately five times
smaller than the esimate in the other two specifications.) The best fit is obtained for the
specification with OUT. Its coefficient is significantly positive at the 99% level, as opposed
to that of the ADV variable which is statistically insignificant. In view of the consistency
of the estimates across the three model specifications and the relative superiority of the
OUT specification, we focus on this specification in the remaining base model discussion
as well as the robustness tests.
To ensure that the observed price vector is a Nash equilibrium under the estimated
parameter values, we have verified that condition (C) is satisfied9. Indeed, as proven under
this condition in Theorem 2.2.1, we observed that pj < c̄j + 2/γ for all j = 1, . . . , J . In
fact we found that pj < p̃j = c̄j + 1/γ, so that the observed price vector is in fact the
unique equilibrium as long as p̃ is chosen as the maximum price vector, see the discussion
at the end of Section 3 and Allon et al. (2009, Thm 4.4).
Table 2.3 shows that all of the parameters (α, δ, γ, ζ) are significant at a 99% con-
fidence level. Our estimates indicate that consumers attribute a very high cost to the
time they spend waiting. Both the price and waiting time parameters have a significant
impact on the consumer’s decision. These results confirm our initial conjecture, as well
as the belief expressed by industry experts, that in the fast-food drive-thru industry cus-
tomers trade off price and waiting time. In particular, to overcome an additional second
of waiting time, an outlet will need to compensate an average customer by as much as
$0.05 (= 0.0237/0.492) in a meal whose typical price ranges from $2.25 to $6. This corre-
sponds with an hourly cost rate of approximately ten times the (pre-tax) average wage of
$18/hour and nearly 30 times the (pre-tax) minimum wage in Illinois in 2005 ($6.50/hr).
Even when comparing (opposite) extreme values of the 95% confidence intervals, the av-
9To verify (C) we first checked that ∀j = 1, . . . , N pj < p̄j = c̄j + 2/γ for our estimates of c̄j and γ.
The maximum aggregate share (for the hamburger drive-thru industry relative to the potential consumer
population) observed for any tract/demographic group pair with these estimates was 26%. If any one
firm j raises his price to p̄j and all others raised their prices to p
max, the aggregate market share and, a
fortiori, that of outlet j by itself, is even lower. Therefore, (C) is satisfied.
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erage consumer assigns a cost to waiting which corresponds with a rate of at least $0.04
per second. Since price differences in this industry, as in many others, are rather modest,
this valuation implies that in the drive-thru market waiting time plays a more significant
role than pricing in explaining sales volumes. Moreover, these results seem to justify the
continuing trend of chains making substantial investments to improve their waiting time.
It is also interesting to compare waiting time and distance sensitivity. After all, the
disutility associated with the distance factor arises mainly from the associated time loss.
Assuming, for example, an average velocity of 30 miles/hr, the estimate of δ implies
that every additional second spent driving to the outlet reduces the utility measure by
0.824x30/3600 = 0.69E−2. Thus the disutility of time spent waiting in the drive-thru line
is at least three times that associated with the traveling time. This finding is consistent
with the literature, see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) and Larson (1987), which
reveal that individuals value time very differently, depending on the context and the
degree to which time is spent is pleasurable or not: most people mind time spent driving
far less than time waiting idly; some even enjoy the ride.
There are some limitations to be noted with the estimation of the contribution of
travel time to the overall utility value. First, we do not have an exact measure of the
road distance between the consumer’s residence and the outlets. Even if we did, this
distance is not the best possible measure for the additional effort and time she needs to
expend to travel to the outlet. After all, many consumers stop in a drive-thru on the
way from one point to the other, so that the disutility associated with travel time is not
perfectly measured by the distance between the consumer’s residence or work place and
the outlet. Finally, it is not clear that a consumer’s disutility from travel varies linearly
with the distance driven.
When omitting waiting time as an explanatory variable, the resulting price sensitivity
estimate is 0.543, a 10.5% increase compared with the estimate we obtain with the full
model. In fact, this estimate lies outside the confidence interval obtained using the full
model. Indeed, when service level attributes such as waiting time are disregarded, any
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reasonable estimation method can be expected to attribute a greater weight to price
differentials to explain differences in sales volumes and market shares. Furthermore,
estimating the elasticity of demand with respect to price using the model without waiting
time results in overestimating this price elasticity by more than 10%. Not accounting for
the waiting time as a strategic attribute also overstates the utility value of the outside
good and disguises the importance of the chains’ number of outlets in the county, the
best identified indicator of the consumers’ perception of chain quality. These various
distortions contribute to suboptimal pricing decisions when ignoring waiting time as an
explanatory variable in the consumer choice model.
It is also of interest to compare our results with those of Thomadsen (2005a) who
employed a similar model to estimate market share equations in the hamburger fast-food
industry in Santa Clara, California. Thomadsen’s consumer choice model disregards
differences in service attributes as explanatory variables but includes the co-ownership
structure (i.e., multi-outlet owners) and brand dummies. Consistent with our findings
regarding the impact of omitted service attributes, Thomadsen’s estimate for the price
sensitivity parameter is systematically larger than (, in his case approximately double,)
the value we obtain. Along with considering all national chains with five or more outlets in
the county, we represent the fast-food market as more competitive than Thomadsen does,
in that we disregard the fact that a certain percentage of franchise owners own multiple
outlets. (As mentioned, we lacked information about common ownership.) Ignoring the
limited co-ownership phenomenon, see Footnote 10, results in underestimated equilibrium
price sensitivity estimates, for given observed price levels. Note, that even if the price
sensitivity parameters were double our estimate, the estimated cost of waiting time would
be approximately $90/hr. Finally, Thomadsen reports only a 90% confidence interval on
the price estimate, (.14,1.68), which has a margin of error nearly 20 times that of our
90% interval. Indeed, our confidence interval is entirely contained in his.
45
2.5.1 Robustness Testing
We have conducted various tests to confirm the robustness of our estimates beyond the
consistency of the parameter estimates across the three model specifications, as well
as the relatively narrow confidence intervals. These additional robustness tests consist
of (i) adding the macro moments discussed in Section 2.4 and listed in Appendix A.3
to the GMM estimation procedure10; (ii) repeating the estimation procedure under the
assumption that only the three largest chains - McDonald’s, Burger King, and Wendy’s -
have a presence in the county and (iii) repeating the estimation under the assumption that
the largest chain, i.e., McDonald’s is absent in the county, thereby reducing the number
of outlets by 44%. All of the additional robustness tests employ the specification with the
OUT attribute. Table 2.4 reports the estimates under the above three alternatives, while
restating the estimates of the base model. (As before, the numbers within parentheses
denote a 95% confidence interval.) Once again, we have remarkable consistency in all of
the parameter estimates among the different variants of the model/estimation procedure.
Table 2.4: Parameter Estimates Under 3 Alternatives to the Base Model
Base Model with MM {McD, BK, WN} w/out McD
Price 4.92E-01 5.03E-01 5.08E-01 5.14E-01
($) (4.05E-01, 5.00E-01)
Waiting Time 2.37E-02 2.01E-02 2.05E-02 2.13E-02
(sec) (2.05E-02, 2.95E-02)
Distance 8.24E-01 7.70E-01 8.53E-01 7.16E-01
(mi) (8.11E-01, 1.26E+00)
Brand Proxy 1.39E-02 9.07E-03 1.34E-02 2.47E-02
(Num. Outlets) (1.37E-02, 2.59E-02)
10The estimates with macro-moments are based on a single stage of estimation. We were unable to
perform the second estimation stage since the moment variance-covariance matrices at most candidate
optima were close to singular.
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2.5.2 Counterfactuals
How much, then, is it worth to reduce the waiting time standards? We mentioned the
industry maxim that a seven-second reduction in waiting times increases a chain’s market
share by 1%. We have therefore investigated the impact of a single chain reducing its
waiting time standard by seven seconds, allowing all outlets to adjust their prices to the
new price equilibrium. The results of this experiment can be seen in Table 2.5. In the
“first row” section (i.e., the two rows with ‘Initial’ in the title), we give the estimated
daily demand and market share of each chain at the current waiting time standards
and prices. The second row section, titled ‘McD’, shows the change in every chain’s
market share and demand volume when McDonald’s reduces its waiting time by seven
seconds. The following five row sections contain the results of the same experiment for
the remaining five chains. The percentage of the total market captured at the current
waiting time standards closely matches the results in Paeratakul et al. (2003), providing
further validation of our estimates.
Our results confirm that the industry maxim is, on “average”, correct. However,
the absolute change in market share ranges from 3% at McDonald’s (the market leader)
to 0.04% at Dairy Queen, with Wendy’s, the chain with the fastest service in 2007 and
2008, experiencing an increase by 1.33%. (The percentage increase in market share ranges
between 4% at McDonald’s and 20% at Dairy Queen.) Here, a chain’s market share is
defined as the chains’ sales as a percentage of the total sales in the hamburger drive-thru
industry. Even more importantly, an unmatched reduction of McDonald’s waiting time
standard by seven seconds results in an increase of its sales volume by approximately 15%.
Note that the increase in demand comes primarily from attracting new customers to the
market. The percentage of the potential fast-food market captured by all the chains grows
by more than 1% when any of the three large players lower their waiting time. As further
discussed in Section 2.6, any chain’s unilateral waiting time reduction is likely to induce
waiting time changes by the competing firms. Indeed, between 2005 and 2008, almost
all chains gradually reduced their waiting time standards, McDonald’s from 224 to 158
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Table 2.5: Change In Market Share Following 7-Second Wait Standard Reduc-
tion at a Chain
McD BK WN Wh. C DQ S ’n S %Tot
Mkt
Initial 5.58E+5 2.26E+5 1.33E+5 1.83E+4 1.95E+3 1.35E+3 14.2%
Demand
Initial 59.47% 24.06% 14.16% 1.95% 0.21% 0.14% NA
Mkt Share
McD (∆Dem) 6.76E+4 -2.90E+3 -1.57E+3 -2.32E+2 -2.04E+1 -1.32E+1 15.2%
(∆Mkt Sh) 3.02% -1.80% -1.05% -0.15% -0.02% -0.01%
BK -2.93E+3 2.93E+4 -6.36E+2 -9.67E+1 -8.01E+0 -5.10E+0 14.6%
-1.88% 2.40% -0.44% -0.06% -0.01% 0.00%
WN -1.58E+3 -6.38E+2 1.76E+04 -5.34E+1 -5.66E+0 -3.68E+0 14.5%
-1.12% -0.45% 1.62% -0.04% 0.00% 0.00%
WC -2.36E+2 -9.73E+1 -5.36E+1 2.48E+3 -6.47E-1 -2.43E-1 14.3%
-0.16% -0.06% -0.04% 0.26% 0.00% 0.00%
DQ -2.07E+1 -8.06E+0 -5.69E+0 -6.48E-1 2.64E+2 -7.12E-2 14.2%
-0.02% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00%
SS -1.33E+1 -5.13E+0 -3.69E+0 -2.43E-1 -7.12E-2 1.84E+2 14.2%
-0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02%
All 6.23E+4 2.52E+4 1.51E+4 2.05E+3 2.25E+2 1.59E+2 15.8%
-0.01% -0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
seconds and Wendy’s from 173 to 131. Therefore, in the last row section of Table 2.5 we
report the impact of a simultaneous seven-second reduction of the average waiting time
by all chains. This simultaneous service improvement results in the six chains capturing
an additional 1.5% of the potential market. Relative market share changes are small, with
Wendy’s the prime beneficiary in relative terms, perhaps because, for it, the seven-second
reduction is the largest relative service improvement among all six chains.
2.6 Conclusions and Extensions
In this essay, we have proposed an approach to estimate how sales volumes for a service
organization depend on all prices and waiting times of the various service providers in
the region, along with other relevant attributes. We have applied this approach to the
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drive-thru fast-food industry in Cook County, IL. Here, consumers assign an implicit
value to waiting in the drive-thru queue which amounts to many times the pre-tax U.S.
wage, thus answering the first two of the four main research questions raised in the
Introduction. Most importantly, chains can improve their absolute and relative market
shares very significantly by relatively modest reductions in waiting time, which explains
why all chains make continuous efforts to shave off seconds from their consumer waiting
time: reducing waiting time standards pays off handsomely in the fast-food industry.
A seven-second reduction, the magnitude of Wendy’s improvement from 2007 to 2008,
implies an “average” increase of a chain’s market share by approximately one percentage
point which confirms the above industry maxim and answers the third research question.
However, for a large chain like McDonald’s, it would result in an increase by more than 3%
while the increase is 0.04% for a small chain like Dairy Queen, thus providing an answer
to the fourth and final research question. The competitive dynamics are such that, to
the extent feasible via incremental process and technological improvements, it is in all
chains’ interests to reduce their waiting times; this occurs to a large extent because such
service improvements result in more potential consumers selecting the fast-food option.
Several important extensions of our study and underlying model would be valuable.
First, it is not clear whether the waiting time experience is best characterized by the
average alone, or (, additionally,) by other measures such as the standard deviation
and/or a percentile (say the 90-th percentile) of the waiting time distribution. Even if
the average waiting time is the best proxy, it is conceivable that the consumer’s utility
level diminishes in a non-linear way with it. A similar non-linear dependence on the
distance variable may be explored as well. In addition, other service attributes such as
the accuracy of the order filling process and the clarity of the speaker and menu board
could be included as explanatory variables in the random utility model (2.1).
Studying the impact of finer segmentations of the population, including past patronage
of specific outlets, so as to estimate the impact of loyalty/inertia would be of interest.
However, without sales volumes for the period of interest, this fine level of segmentation
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is not feasible. Nevertheless, in the modified specification of the utility functions, we
have added explanatory variables that reflect brand penetration and awareness in Cook
County.
While, as explained in Section 2.3, we believe that a consumer choice model with a
single price indicator per outlet is most appropriate for this industry, it could be worth-
while to test a far more detailed model that considers a menu of items to be purchased at
every outlet and consumers choosing an outlet/menu item combination. It goes without
saying that the data gathering and estimation challenges associated with such a detailed
model are formidable, especially in the absence of sales data.
It would also be desirable to investigate how the chains in the industry select their
waiting time standards and how the costs associated with waiting time reductions com-
pare with the resulting revenue enhancements. To this end, it appears natural to view the
price competition model in this essay as the second stage in a two-stage game preceded
by a first stage in which the chains as competing players select waiting time standards
to maximize their profits. Specification and estimation of such a first stage model meets
with various challenges. First, Lafontaine and Shaw (1999) document that franchises
typically pay a fixed periodic fee to the chain, along with a percentage of the revenues.
However, it is unclear how these parameters are set as a function of the desired waiting
time standard. It is also unclear how investments and operational costs depend on this
strategic choice. Moreover, since chains select national standards, a two stage game is
needed with all US outlets participating in the second stage price competition game. It is
also unclear whether all chains face the same potential lower limits for the waiting time
standard. A final challenge is to verify whether the first stage competition model has a
(unique) pure strategy equilibrium.
More broadly, the modeling approach and estimation technique of our study could be
applied in other service industries in which consumers make purchasing decisions based on
a steady state service measure as opposed to the one prevailing at the time they consider
entering the service system. In most other service industries, one may expect that the
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service level measures vary by individual service provider. This greatly simplifies the
identification challenges in the specification of the consumer choice model but increases
the data collection effort as one needs direct observations for every provider in the chosen
market. In addition, in our study we are able to estimate the model without knowledge
of sales volumes or marginal cost rates because of the absence of unobservable firm (i.e.,
outlet)-specific attributes that can be argued to have a consistent impact on consumers’
purchasing decisions. In industries where such an argument is not valid, the estimation






Functions with Random Coefficients
We refer to Section 1.4 for an introduction and summary of the models used and results
obtained in this chapter. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 provides a
review of the relevant literature. Section 3.2 introduces the consumer choice model. Our
equilibrium existence and uniqueness results are presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4
develops the example showing that a Nash equilibrium may fail to exist in the absence of
any conditions precluding highly concentrated markets or, alternatively, enforcing suffi-
ciently tight price limits. Section 3.5 discusses extensions of our base model which allow
for a continuous specification of customer types, firms offering multiple products, and set-
tings with a general income distribution. Our final section 3.6 describes the implications
of these results for the econometrician attempting to estimate the model parameters.
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3.1 Literature Review
There has been a plethora of price competition models for industries with differenti-
ated products or services, beginning with the seminal paper by Bertrand (1883). One
important class of such competition models employs demand functions based on a MNL
discrete choice model. This model was proposed by McFadden (1976), a contribution
later awarded with the 2000 Nobel Price in Economics. As explained in the Introduction,
the model may be derived from an underlying random utility model, see (3.1) in Section
3.2, with homogeneous coefficients, i.e., the special case where the customer population
does not need to be segmented. Luce and Suppes (1965) attribute this derivation to an
unpublished manuscript by Holman and Marley. The MNL model has been widely used
in the economics, marketing, and operations management literature, among many other
fields, see, for example Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1993), Anderson et al. (2001), and Talluri
and Van Ryzin (2005). The MNL model satisfies the so-called Independence of Irrele-
vant Alternatives (IAA) axiom according to which the ratio of any pair of firms’ market
shares is independent of the set of other alternatives that are offered to the consumers.
This axiom was first postulated by Luce (1959) but Debreu (1960) pointed out that the
IIA property is highly restrictive, as illustrated by his famous red bus-blue bus example:
the relative market share of an alternative is, in general, significantly affected if a close
substitute to this alternative is added to the choice set.
To remedy this problem, Ben-Akiva (1973) introduced the so-called nested logit model,
where the choice process is modeled as a two-stage nested process: the consumer first
selects among broad classes of alternatives (, e.g., air versus ground transportation) and
subsequently a specific variant among the selected class of alternatives (e.g., a specific
flight). This approach still ignores systematic differences in the way different customer
segments trade off relevant attributes of the various products or services. To address the
issue of systematic customer heterogeneity, the mixed multinomial logit model (MMNL)
was introduced, apparently first by Boyd and Mellman (1980) and Cardell and Dunbar
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(1980); earlier papers in the seventies, for example Westin (1974), had derived a similar
model by treating, in a single segment model, the attribute vector as random with a given
distribution. The properties of the MMNL model have been extensively studied in the
economics and marketing literature, see e.g., Train et al. (1987), Steckel and Vanhonacker
(1988), Gonul and Srinivasan (1993), Berry (1994), Jain et al. (1994). More recently,
McFadden and Train (2000) show that, under mild conditions, any discrete choice model
derived from random utility maximization generates choice probabilities that can be
approximated, arbitrarily closely, by a MMNL model. Moreover, these authors show that
MMNL models enjoy numerical and estimation advantages beyond other discrete choice
models. (It would be of considerable interest to extend our results to the general class of
choice models considered by McFadden and Train (2000).)
Whether or not a Nash equilibrium exists in a Bertrand price competition model
depends fundamentally on the structure of the demand functions as well as the cost
structure. The same applies to the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) and Topkis (1998) identified broad classes of demand functions under which the
resulting price-competition model is supermodular, a property guaranteeing the existence
of a Nash equilibrium.
More specifically, for the pure MNL model with a cost structure that is affine in the
sales volume, Anderson et al. (2001) established the existence of a (unique) Nash equilib-
rium in the special case where all firms are symmetric, i.e., have identical characteristics.
Bernstein and Federgruen (2004) extended this result for the case of general asymmetric
firms, and a generalization of MNL models referred to as attraction models. For the same
model, Gallego et al. (2006) provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique
equilibrium, under cost structures which depend on the firm’s sales volume according to
an increasing convex function. Konovalov and Sándor (2009) recently showed that the
existence of a unique equilibrium can be guaranteed in the multi-product generalization
of a pure MNL-price competition model.
Seemingly minor variants of the pure MNL model may result in a fundamentally
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different equilibrium behavior of the associated price competition model. For example,
Cachon and Harker (2003) report that under a simple piecewise linear transformation
of the MNL demand functions, and a cost function that is proportional to the square
root of the sales volume, the model may have no, one or multiple equilibria as a single
parameter is varied. (This is demonstrated with an example involving two symmetric
firms.) Similar erratic behavior was demonstrated by Chen and Wan (2003) for what
is, arguably, the seminal price competition model for service competition, due to Luski
(1976) and Levhari and Luski (1978).
For price competition models with nested logit demand functions, Liu (2006) recently
established the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. As mentioned in the Introduction,
Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) is the seminal paper establishing sufficient conditions for the
existence of a price equilibrium when the demand functions are based on a broad class of
MMNL models. They also show that, under these conditions, a unique price equilibrium
exists in the case of a duopoly or when products are characterized by their price and a
single, one-dimensional attribute, while the density of the customer type distribution is
log-concave (See Dierker (1991) for an alternative treatment). As mentioned by many
authors, e.g., Berry et al. (1995) and Thomadsen (2005b), these sufficient conditions are
often not satisfied in many industry-based models.
Peitz (2000, 2002) have shown that a price equilibrium exists in certain variants of the
Caplin and Nalebuff model, allowing for settings where customers maximize their utility
functions subject to a budget constraint or when they may purchase an arbitrary amount
of each of the products in the market, as opposed to a single unit. Unfortunately, the
utility functions in Peitz do not depend on the product prices, so that the firms’ incentive
to mitigate price levels arises purely from the customers’ budget constraints. Mizuno
(2003) establishes the existence of a unique price equilibrium for certain classes of models
(e.g., logit, nested logit) in which the demand functions are log-supermodular. As we
show at the end of Section 3.3 this property fails to apply in general MMNL models.
As explained in the Introduction, our model assumptions generalize those made in
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Caplin and Nalebuff (1991). Our essay also builds on results in Thomadsen (2005b)
which provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a price equilibrium - but not its
uniqueness - when the demand functions arise from a general MMNL model; his condition
relates the firm’s variable cost rate to the value of the non-price related variables in
the utility measures, see (3.1) below. It is difficult to assess how widely applicable the
condition is.
3.2 The Price Competition Model
Consider an industry with J competing single-product firms each selling a specific good
or service. The firms differentiate themselves via an arbitrary series of observable product
characteristics as well as their price. Each firm faces a cost structure which is affine in
the expected sales volume. Customers are assumed to purchase only one unit and can be
segmented into K distinct groups, each with a known population size. (In Section 3.5,
we discuss models with a continuum of customer types or market segments. All of the
results obtained in Section 3.3, for the case of a finite set of market segments, continue
to apply there.) If the potential buyers in the model represent consumers, the different
segments may, for example, represent different geographical areas, in combination with
socioeconomic attributes, such as age, gender, race, income level, number of years of
formal education, occupational and marital status, etc. In the case of Business to Business
(B2B) markets, the different segments may again represent different geographical regions,
industry sub-sectors (government agencies, educational institutions, for profit companies)
and firm size levels1. When modeling, for example, an industry of automobile part
suppliers, each automobile manufacturer may represent a segment by itself. The chosen
segmentation should reflect the various observable factors which may impact how different
product attributes are traded off by the potential buyers. We use the following notation
1Firm size may, for example, be defined as the firm’s annual revenues or its capital value.
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for all firms j = 1, . . . , J and customer segments k = 1, . . . , K:
xj = an L-dimensional vector of observable non-price attributes for firmj;
cj = the variable cost rate for firm j;
pj = the price selected by firm j; pj ∈ [pminj , pmaxj ] with 0 ≤ pminj ≤ cj ≤ pmaxj ;
hk = the population size of customer segment k;
Sjk = expected sales volume for firm j among customers in segment k;
Sj = expected aggregate sales volume for firm j across all customer segments;
πjk = expected profit for firm j derived from sales to customers in segment k;
πj = expected aggregate profits for firm j.
We thus assume that each firm selects its price from a given closed interval of feasible
prices. To our knowledge, compact feasible price ranges are required for any of the
known approaches to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium2. At the same time,
the restriction is without loss of essential generality. Consider first pminj . In the absence
of other considerations, we may set pminj = 0
3. As for pmaxj , price limits may result
from a variety of sources, e.g., government regulation, maximum price levels specified by
suppliers or franchisers, limits set by industry organizations, or branding considerations.
In other settings, where no such exogenous price limits prevail, one can always select
unrestrictive upper bounds for pmaxj which are well above reasonable price choices. (For
example, no fast food meal will be priced beyond $20 and no subcompact car beyond
the $25,000 level.) Moreover, we will show that under a widely applicable condition and
pmax sufficiently large, the choice of pmax has no impact on the price equilibrium.
Market shares within each customer segment may be derived from a standard random
2Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), for example, assume that prices are selected from a closed interval
[pmin, pmax] with pminj = cj and p
max
j = Y , the consumer’s income level. We make no upfront specifi-
cation for these limits, allowing 0 ≤ pminj < cj and pmaxj 6= Y Indeed, for certain durable or investment
goods and certain income levels, pj may be in excess of Y.
3We assume pmin ≤ c to ensure, under our existence conditions, that any Nash equilibrium p∗ > pmin,
see Lemma 3.3.1 below.
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utility model, as follows. First, let
uijk = Ujk(xj) +Gj(Yi, pj) + εijk, j = 1, . . . , J ; k = 1, . . . , K; and i = 1, 2, . . . , (3.1)
denote the utility attributed to product j by the ith customer in segment k, with in-
come or firm size Yi. Recall that xj is a vector of observable product attributes. Con-
versely, εijk denotes a random unobserved component of customer utility. The functions
{Ujk, j = 0, . . . , J} are completely general. The second term Gj(·, pj) which we refer to
as the price-income sensitivity function reflects how the utility of each product depends
on its price, where marginal price sensitivity may vary with income level. Similarly, the
utility associated with the no-purchase option is given by
ui0k = U0k(x1, . . . , xJ) + εi0k, k = 1, . . . , K; i = 1, 2, . . . . (3.2)
As we exclude Veblen goods, Gj(·, pj) is decreasing in the price level pj. We assume that
theGj functions in (3.1) are twice differentiable and concave in pj, with limpj↑∞Gj(·, pj) =
−∞. Thus, let
gj(·, pj) = |
∂Gj(·, pj)
∂pj
| = −∂Gj(·, pj)
∂pj
> 0, j = 1, . . . , J and k = 1, . . . , K, (3.3)
denote the (absolute value of the) marginal change in the utility value of product j due
to a marginal change in its price. (Below, we discuss an alternative interpretation of the
gj-functions.) In view of the concavity of the Gj-functions, we have ∀j = 1, . . . , J and
k = 1, . . . , K
gj(·, pj) is increasing in the price level pj. (3.4)
Many model specifications in the literature employ a G(·, ·) function common to all
products j = 1, . . . , J , see, e.g., the various models listed in Section 3 of Caplin and
Nalebuff (1991). However, in some applications, even the marginal utility shift due to
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a price increase may differ among the different competing products4. No assumptions
are needed with respect to the dependence of the price sensitivity function gj(Yi, pj) on
Yi, even though one would typically have that it is decreasing in Yi. As in Caplin and
Nalebuff (1991), we initially assume that all consumers share the same income level or
firm size Y (hereafter referred to as ‘income’ alone). Extensions to the general model,
with varying income levels, are developed in Section 3.5.
To complete the specification of utility functions (3.1) and (3.2), {εijk, j = 0, 1, . . . , N}
is an i.i.d. sequence of random variables, for all i = 1, 2, . . . and k = 1, . . . , K. We further
assume that the random components εijk follow a type 1 - extreme value or Gumbel
distribution:
Pr [εijk ≤ z] = e−e
−(z/δ+γ)
, j = 0, . . . , J ; k = 1, . . . , K; i = 1, 2, . . . , (3.5)
where γ is Euler’s constant (0.5772) and δ is a scale parameter. The mean and variance of
the random term {εijk} are E[εijk] = 0 and var[εijk] = δ2π2/6. Without loss of generality,
we scale, for each customer segment k=1,...,K, the units in which the utility values are
measured such that δ = 1. This random utility model results in the well known MNL







] ; j = 1 . . . , J ; k = 1, . . . , K. (3.6)
Aggregating the sales volume for individual customer segments in (3.6) over all segments














4Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) already recognized the value of allowing for product-dependent price-
income sensitivity functions. As explained below, see (3.15), they confine themselves to the case when
these functions differ by a proportionality constant only, thus assuming that for any pair of products,
the ratio of the marginal utility changes due to a $1 price increase remains constant, irrespective of the
products’ price levels.
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An alternative foundation for the sales volume formula (3.6) is to assume that among
potential customers in segment k, each firm j and the no-purchase option have a so-called
attraction value given by:
ajk = e
Ujk(xj)+Gj(Y,pj), j = 1, ..., J, k = 1, ..., K, (3.8)
a0k = e
U0k(x1,...,xJ ), k = 1, ..., K. (3.9)
Under the four intuitive axioms specified in Bell et al. (1975), this uniquely gives rise to
the demand volumes specified in (3.6).
The above consumer choice model thus distinguishes between two types of customer het-
erogeneity: (i) heterogeneity that is attributable to observable customer attributes such
as their geographical location or socio-economic profile, and (ii) intrinsic heterogeneity
not explained by any systematic or observable customer attributes. This model specifi-
cation covers most random utility models in the literature. As an example, consider the
following general specification used in Berry (1994).
uij = xjβi + ξj − αpj + εij, j = 1, ..., J ; i = 1, 2, ... (3.10)
βil = βl + σlζil, l = 1, ..., L and i = 1, 2, ..., (3.11)
Here, {εij} is again a sequence of unobservable random noise terms which is i.i.d. The
vector [α, β, σ] is a 2L+1 dimensional string of parameters. Finally, the sequences {ζil}
and {ξj} are random sequences with zero mean, which may, or may not, be observable.
Often, ξj is used to represent an unobservable utility component which reflects attributes
of firm j unobserved by the modeler but with common value among the customers.
To verify that the general structure in Berry (1994) can be treated as a special case of
(3.1) - (3.5), assume the {ζil} distributions are discrete and segment the customer popu-
lation such that all customers in any segment k, share the same ζil-value for each of the
L observable product attributes, i.e., ζil = ζ̂kl for all customers i in segment k. Specifying
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Ujk(xj) = ξj +
∑L
l=1 xjl[βl + θζ̂kl] and Gj(Yi, pj) = −αpj, we note that the general Berry-
model arises as a special linear specification of our structure. A restriction inherent in
the Berry model is the assumption that α, the marginal disutility for firm j’s product
due to a marginal price increase, is uniform across all products and all price and income
levels. In many practical applications, price sensitivity may vary significantly along any
one of these dimensions.
Other MMNL consumer choice models employ one or more measurable attributes which
depend on the specific firm and customer segment combination. For example, if the cus-
tomer segmentation is in part based on the customer’s geographic location, a measure djk
for the distance between customer segment k and firm j may be added to the specification
in (3.1) as follows:
Ujk(xj) = Fj(xj, djk) + ξjk, (3.12)
with ξjk, again, an unobservable component in firm j’s utility measure that is common
among all customers of segment k. See, for example, the discussion of Thomadsen (2005a)
below.
In other applications, the distance measure djk refers to a measure of a-priori affinity.
For example, if, on the basis of nationalistic sentiments, customers have a propensity to
buy from a domestic provider, this may be modeled by basing the segmentation in part on
the consumer’s nationality and defining the distance djk = 0 if segment k represents the
same nationality as firm j, and djk > 0, otherwise. Alternatively, the a-priori affinity may
be based on past purchasing behavior. Both the economics and the marketing literature
have addressed the fact that customers tend to be inert or firm/brand loyal; i.e., because
of explicit or psychological switching costs, customers tend to stay with their current
provider or brand, even if they would otherwise be more attracted by a competitor.
Dube et al. (2008b), for example, models this as a MMNL model, segmenting customers,
in part, on the basis of the firm most recently patronized; a distance measure djk is added
to the utility measure where djk = 0 if customers of segment k used to buy from firm j
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and djk = 1 otherwise.
Another general model was introduced in the seminal paper by Caplin and Nalebuff
(1991) with the specific objective of establishing the existence of a price equilibrium for a
broad class of consumer choice models. This general model assumes that each potential





αilhl(xjl) + βjΓ(Y − pj), j = 1, ..., J and i = 1, ..., N, (3.13)
for given functions Γ(·) and hl(·), with Γ(·) concave and increasing, and for given con-
stants βj > 0, j = 1, . . . , J
5. In other words, the Caplin-Nalebuff model assumes that
customers characterize each product j in terms of a transformed attribute vector x′j, the
l-th component of which is given by x′jl ≡ hl(xjl), j = 1, . . . , J and l = 1, . . . , L. Cus-
tomers then aggregate the (transformed) attribute values via a linear aggregate measure
with different customers applying a different weight vector α to the attribute values.
Assuming the distribution of α is discrete we obtain the Caplin-Nalebuff structure as a
special case of our random utility model (3.1) - (3.5), as follows: segment the customer
population into segments such that all customers in a segment share the same α values.
In other words, for all customers in segment k, αil = α
(k)
l . The Caplin-Nalebuff model






l hl(xjl), ∀j = 1, ..., J and k = 1, ..., K; (3.14)
Gj(Yi, Pj) = βjΓ(Yi − pj), (3.15)
while the scale parameter δ of the {εjk}-variables are chosen such that δ = 06. Alter-
5Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) consider, in addition, a generalization of (3.13) in which the L-dimensional
vector of product attributes x is first transformed into a L’-dimensional vector of utility benefits t(x).
Instead of (3.13), the utility value of firm j for customer i is then specified as uij =
∑L′
l=1 αiltl(xj) +
βjg(Yi − pj). This specification can also be shown to be a special case of our model. The authors state,
however, that in most applications, preferences take the simpler form of (3.13).
6Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) represent the proportionality constant βj as the (n+ 1)-st utility benefit
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natively, the L-dimensional attribute vector xj may be partitioned into an observable
and an unobservable part: x = [x′, x′′] with x′ an L′-dimensional vector of observable at-
tributes and x′′ a J-dimensional vector of product indicator variables, i.e., xj,L′+j = 1 and
xj,L′+m = 0 ∀m 6= j. If the weights {αl : l = L′+ 1, . . . , L′+ J} follow independent Gum-
bel distributions, denoting (unobserved) utility components while each point (α1, . . . , αL′)
constitutes a separate market segment, we retrieve a (specific type of) MMNL models
where the mixture is over the given distribution of (α1, . . . , αL′) only. To obtain the exis-
tence of a Nash equilibrium in this price competition model, the authors assume, further,
that the probability density function f(α) of the consumer attribute vector α is ρ-concave
for a specific value of ρ, i.e. for any pair of points α(0) and α(1) in the convex support of
the distributions, and any scalar 0 < λ < 1:
f(λα(0) + (1− λ)α(1)) ≥ [λf(α(0))ρ + (1− λ)f(α(1))ρ]1/ρ and ρ = −1/(L+ 1). (3.16)
Thomadsen (2005a) has shown that geographic distance measures can be incorporated
in this specification by appending an indicator vector for each of the J firm locations.
However, the author also shows that the requirement of a ρ-concave probability density
function for the customer attribute vector α precludes all but the most restrictive geo-
graphic customer distributions. In addition, under the Caplin-Nalebuff model, the price
income sensitivity function Gj for the different products j = 1, . . . , J differ from each
other only in the proportionality constant βj. Moreover, the customer’s income and the
product’s price impact the product’s utility value only via their difference. This repre-
sents a significant restriction, in particular when dealing with items or services, the unit
price of which constitutes a negligible fraction of a typical customer’s income.
Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) showed that many of the existing consumer choice models arise
as a special case of their model, including the classical models by Hotelling (1929) and
Lancaster Kelvin (1966), Perloff and Salop (1985), Jaskold Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979),
measure associated with the product, i.e., βj = tn+1(xj).
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Shaked and Sutton (1982), Economides (1989), Christensen et al. (1975), and Anderson
et al. (2001). All of these models specify Γ(Yi− pj) = Yi− pj or Γ(Yi− pj) = log(Yi− pj).
This includes the consumer choice model in the later, seminal Berry et al. (1995) paper;
where Gj(Yi, pj) = βΓ(Yi − pj) = βlog(Yi − pj).
We conclude this section with a few preliminary results related to our model. It is easily
verified that, in each market segment, the price sensitivity of each firm’s demand with
respect to its own price is given by
∂Sjk
∂pj






), j = 1, . . . , J ; k = 1, . . . , K. (3.18)
In other words, gj(Y, pj) may be interpreted as the percentage increase in firm j’s market
share, due to a unit price decrease, expressed as a fraction of the percentage of market
segment k, not yet captured by the firm. We therefore refer to gj(·, ·) as the price
penetration rate. Similarly, the price sensitivity of firm j’s demand with respect to the
competitor’s price is given by
∂Sjk
∂pm
= gm(Y, pm)SmkSjk/hk, m 6= j. (3.19)








, j = 1, . . . , J. (3.20)
This condition is a classical dominant-diagonal condition (see e.g. Vives (2001)) and
merely precludes that a uniform price increase by all J firms would result in an increase
of any of the firms’ expected sales volume.
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3.3 The equilibrium behavior in the price competi-
tion model
In this section, we provide a sufficient condition under which the price competition
model permits a Nash equilibrium and a second, somewhat stronger, condition under
which this equilibrium is unique. These conditions merely preclude a very high degree
of market concentration and are easily verified on the basis of the model primitives only.
We conclude the section with a sufficient condition for a (unique) Nash equilibrium that
applies to markets with an arbitrary degree of market concentration. Unlike, for example,
the existence conditions in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), our conditions allow for arbitrary
distributions of the population sizes {hk : k = 1, . . . , K} in the various customer seg-
ments.
Recall that, for any of the K market segments, gj(Y, pj) may be interpreted as the per-
centage increase in firm j’s market share - expressed as a function of the percentage of
the market segment not yet captured by the firm - due to a unit decrease in the firm’s
prices. Similarly, let
ωj(Y, pj) = (pj − cj)gj(Y, pj), (3.21)
denote a dimensionless elasticity, i.e., for any of the K market segments the percentage
increase in firm j’s market share - expressed as a function of the percentage of the market
not yet captured by the firm - due to a one percent decrease in the variable profit margin.
As the product of two continuous functions ωj(Y, pj) is continuous, with ωj(Y, cj) = 0
and limpj↑∞ ωj(Y, pj) =∞. By the intermediate value theorem, we conclude that, for any
critical elasticity level η > 0 there exists a price level p̄j(η) > cj, with ωj(Y, p̄j(η)) = η.
Moreover, ωj is strictly increasing as the product of an increasing and a strictly increasing





p1j ≤ p̄j(η) ≤ p2j ,
ωj(Y, p
1
j) ≤ ωj(Y, p̄j(η)) = (p̄j(η)− cj)gj(Y, p̄j(η)) = η ≤ ωj(Y, p2j). (3.22)
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Our main condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the interior of the price
region, or even a unique such equilibrium, consists of excluding the possibility of excessive
market concentration. In particular, existence of a Nash equilibrium can be guaranteed if
any single firm captures less than 50% of the potential market in any customer segment
when pricing at a level which, under the condition, will be shown to be an upper bound
for the firm’s equilibrium price choice. Similarly, if every single firm captures less than
one third of the potential market in each segment (- again when pricing at a level which,
under the condition, is shown to be an upper bound for his price choice -), a unique Nash
equilibrium can be guaranteed. Thus, for any maximum market share 0 < µ < 1 among
all potential customers in each segment, we define the following condition:
C(µ) In each market segment k = 1, . . . , K, each firm j captures less than µ of the market
among all potential customers when pricing at the level p̄j((1−µ)−1)(j = 1, . . . , J),
(irrespective of what prices the competitors choose within the feasible price range).
As mentioned, the critical maximal market shares µ of importance in the results below
are µ = 1/2 and µ = 1/3.
The following lemma shows that, under C(µ), any firm j’s relevant price region may
be restricted to [cj, p̄j((1− µ)−1)].
Lemma 3.3.1 Fix µ > 0. Under condition C(µ), the best response of any firm j to
any given feasible price vector p−j is a price cj ≤ p∗j(p−j) ≤ p̄j((1− µ)−1).
Proof: Fix j = 1, . . . , J . Clearly, πj(pj, p−j) < 0 = πj(cj, p−j) for any pj < cj so that





















for any price pj ≥ p̄j((1 − µ)−1). To verify (3.23), note from (3.22) that for pj ≥
p̄j((1−µ)−1), ωj(Y, pj) ≥ (1−µ)−1, while (1− Sjkhk ) > (1−µ). The later inequality follows
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from Sjk being decreasing in pj, see (3.17), while Sjk/hk < µ when pj = p̄j((1 − µ)−1),
see C(µ). 
Thus, the market concentration test C(µ) is conducted while setting each firm’s price
level above what (, under the condition,) is rational. Therefore, as rational firms will
price below p̄((1 − µ)−1), condition C(µ) does not preclude that, in equilibrium, a firm
captures a share above µ in some or all market segments. Since a firm’s market share is
maximized when all competitors adopt maximal prices, condition C(µ) is easily verified
as follows:
e[Ujk(xj)+Gj(Y,p̄j)]




≤ µ, ∀j = 1, . . . , J, k = 1, . . . , K,
(3.24)
where p̄j, is shorthand notation for p̄j((1 − µ)−1). Clearly, the larger the value chosen
for pmax, the stronger condition C(µ) becomes. Therefore, if one is unwilling to specify
pmax upfront, there are two alternative ways to proceed. First, one may determine, p̂(µ)
as the smallest of the JK unique roots of the equations in the single variable p:
e[Ujk(xj)+Gj(Y,p̄j)]




= µ j = 1, . . . , J and k = 1, . . . , K.
(3.25)
C(µ) is satisfied for any pmax ≤ p̂(µ). If p̂(µ) is in excess of a reasonable upper bound for
the products’ prices, pmax may be set to p̂(µ) without loss of generality and C(µ) may
be assumed up front. Second, the following is a much stronger version of C(µ), which
is obtained by letting pmax → ∞ and is therefore independent of the boundary of the
feasible region:
C’(µ) No individual firm j has, in any of the market segments, an expected utility
measure larger than that of the no-purchase option, assuming the firm’s product is
priced at the level p̄j((1− µ)−1), i.e.,
Ujk(xj)+Gj(Y, p̄j((1−µ)−1)+ log(µ−1−1) ≤ U0j(x1, ..., xJ) ∀j = 1, . . . , J, k = 1, . . . , K.
(3.26)
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The implication C ′(µ) ⇒ C(µ) follows, after some algebra, by observing that the left
hand side of (3.24) is increasing in pmax, and letting pmax →∞.
For µ = 1/2, condition C(1/2) is easily satisfied in the applications we are familiar
with as is its stronger version C ′(1/2)7. In these industrial organization studies, no single
firm captures the majority of the potential market, (in particular when pricing at a most
unfavorable price level). For example, in the drive-thru fast food industry studied in
Chapter 2, the largest (estimated) market share obtained by the entire industry in any
one market segment, defined in that paper as customers sharing demographic features
and a geographic location, is 0.26. Furthermore, all firms in the study had prices below
p̄(2). Therefore, if any given firm j raises its price to p̄j(2), and all others raise their
prices to their maximum levels, the largest market share of the entire industry, and, a
fortiori, that of firm j itself, would certainly be below 26%. Therefore, C(1/2) is satisfied.
Even condition C’(1/2) is very easily satisfied since the largest value for the left hand
side of (3.24) is 0.0047 when pmax = ∞. Thomadsen (2005a) studies the drive-thru fast
food industry in Santa Clara where a similar dispersion of market shares, in each of the
market segments considered, can be assumed.
As a last example, consider the ready-to-eat cereal industry, which is widely charac-
terized as one with high concentration, high price-cost margins, a quote from the opening
sentence in Nevo (2001); see Schmalensee (1978) and Scherer(‘1982) for similar character-
izations. In this industry, each of the competing manufacturers offers a series of cereals, so
an adequate representation of this industry requires a multi-product competition model as
in Section 3.6.3. (Indeed, Nevo(2001) has estimated such a multi-product MMNL model
for the industry.) In spite of this industry being viewed as one of high concentration, the
aggregate market share of Kellogg, the largest competitor, varied between 41,2% in the
first quarter of 1988 and 32.6% in the last quarter of 1992, with market shares calculated
among all cereal consumers as opposed to the potential consumer population.
7The following is another sufficient condition for C(1/2): The no-purchase option captures the ma-
jority of the consumer population, in each market segment, even when all firms select pmin. While much
stronger than C(1/2), it is clearly satisfied in many industries.
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We now establish that, under condition C(1/2), a Nash equilibrium exists and that
the set of Nash equilibria coincides exactly with the solutions to the system of FOC
equations.
Theorem 3.3.2 Assume condition C(1/2) applies and p̄(2) ∈ [pmin, pmax]8.
(a) The Price Competition Model has a Nash equilibrium.






Sjk[1− (pj − cj)gj(Y, pj)(1−
Sjk
hk
)] = 0, ∀ j = 1, . . . , J, (3.27)
and has c < p∗ < p̄(2).
(c) Every solution to the FOC is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: To simplify the notation, we write p̄ as shorthand for p̄(2).
(a) In order to prove the result on the full price cube, we first establish the existence
of a Nash equilibrium p∗ in the interior of the restricted price cube XJj=1[p
min
j , p̄j]. This
follows from the Nash-Debreu theorem as each firm’s feasible action set [pminj , p̄j] is a
compact, convex set and as the profit function πj(p) is concave in pj on the complete
price cube XJj=1[p
min
j , p̄j]. Concavity follows by differentiating (3.23) with respect to pj
8If p̄(2) /∈ [pmin, pmax], it is still possible to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium, however
one in which some or all of the price levels are at the boundary of the feasible price region, i.e., parts



























































To verify the inequality, note that the second term to the right of (3.28) is negative since
gj(Y, pj) is increasing in pj (see (3.4)). As to the first term, it follows from (3.22) that
gj(Y, pj)(pj − cj) < 2 for all pj < p̄j. Thus, since Sjk/hk ≥ 0,
[−2 + gj(Y, pj)(pj − cj)(1− 2
Sjk
hk
)] < 0, k = 1, . . . , K. (3.29)
We have shown that a price vector p∗ exists which is a Nash equilibrium on the re-
stricted price cube XJj=1[p
min
j , p̄j]. To show that p





j ] as well, is suffices to show that πj(pj, p
∗







−j) ∀ pj > p̄j.
The first inequality follows from Lemma 3.3.1, while the second inequality follows from
the fact that p∗ is a Nash equilibrium on the price vector XJj=1[p
min
j , p̄j].
(b) In view of Lemma 3.3.1 and since pmin ≤ c, any price equilibrium p∗ ∈ XJj=1[pminj , p̄j].
To show that it is, in fact, an interior point of XJj=1[cj, p̄j], and hence a solution of the












< 0, by Lemma
3.3.1.
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(c) Consider a solution, p∗ of the FOC (3.27). It follows from (3.23) that p∗j < p̄j ∀ j =




j , p̄j], p
∗





j ] as well. 
The following theorem establishes that a unique Nash equilibrium can be guaranteed
under the slightly stronger condition C(1/3).
Theorem 3.3.3 Assume condition C(1/3) applies and p̄(3/2) ∈ [pmin, pmax].
(a) The price competition model has a unique Nash equilibrium p∗ < p̄(3/2) which satisfies
the FOC equations (3.27).
(b) The FOC equations (3.27) have p∗ as their unique solution.
Proof: Following the proof of Theorem 3.3.2, replacing µ = 1/2 by µ = 1/3, we obtain
the existence of a Nash equilibrium c < p∗ < p̄(3/2), which is a solution to the FOC
equations (3.27), and, vice versa, every solution to this system of equations is a Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, without loss of generality, the price region may be restricted to
P = XJj=1[cj, p̃j(3/2)]. It therefore suffices to show that the equilibrium is unique. We










| , j = 1, . . . , J. (3.30)
This inequality is a sufficient condition for the best response function to be a contraction
mapping, see Vives (2001). Fix j = 1, . . . , J . By the definition of p̄j(3/2) = p̄j((1−1/3)−1)
and (3.22), we have
gj(Y, pj)(pj − cj) < 3/2 ∀ pj < p̄j(3/2), so that
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1/2 > 1− gj(Y, pj)(pj − cj)(1− 2
Sjk
hk
) > −0.5, ∀ pj < p̄j(
3
2
), ∀k = 1, . . . , K, (3.31)
2− gj(Y, pj)(pj − cj)(1− 2
Sjk
hk
) > +0.5, ∀ pj < p̄j(
3
2
), ∀k = 1, . . . , K, (3.32)
by the mere fact that 1/3 ≥ Sjk/hk > 0. In particular, for all pj < p̄j(32), and all k =
1, . . . , K:
2− gj(Y, pj)(pj − cj)(1− 2
Sjk
hk


































































where the first inequality follows from (3.4), thus completing the verification of (3.30).

The conditions needed for existence and uniqueness, C(µ), bear a remarkable relation
to standard policy criteria used to define “moderately” or “highly concentrated” markets.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) measure the
degree of concentration in a market via the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), defined
as the sum of the squares of the market shares represented as percentages. (This index
has the maximum value of 10,000 in case of a monopoly and approaches zero if the market
is divided among a very large number of competitors with an equal market share.) The
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DOJ-FTC 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines define a market with an HHI below 1,000
as “unconcentrated”, one between 1,000 and 1,800 as “moderately concentrated”, and
those with an HHI above 1,800 as “highly concentrated”. Interestingly, when C(1/3) is
violated the minimum possible HHI equals 1,111, and 2,500 when C(1/2) is violated910.
(Thus, while it is unclear what the cut off value of 1,800 was based on, it corresponds with
the average of the minimum HHI-values when C(1/2) and C(1/3) are violated.) These
1992 DOJ-FTC guidelines were updated in April 2010 and the new HHI cutoff level for a
“highly concentrated market” has been increased from 1,800 to 2,500, the minimal value
when C(1/2) is violated.
3.4 Counter Example
The following counter example demonstrates that a condition like C(1/2), broadly ap-
plicable as it is, is necessary for the existence of a Nash Equilibrium. Our counter example
was inspired by Su and Judd (2008) who exhibit that multiple equilibria may arise in a
price competition model with 2 firms (no outside good) and 3 customer segments, and a
combination of linear and Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) demand functions.
(A similar example, showing the existence of multiple equilibria was, apparently, iden-
tified by Dube et al. (2008a).) Consider a market with two firms and three consumer
segments (i.e., J = 2, K = 3) whose consumer utility functions are defined as follows:
Firm 1: Ui11 = A− p1 + εi11; Ui12 = εi12; Ui13 = B − p1 + εi13;
Firm 2: Ui21 = εi21; Ui22 = A− p2 + εi22; Ui23 = B − p2 + εi23.
9These minima arise when a single firm captures one third or half of the market, respectively, with
the remainder of the market being divided equally among infinitely many competitors.
10The FTC calculates the HHI based on the anticipated post-merger equilibrium, measuring market
shares as a percentage of aggregate sales in the industry. Our C(µ) conditions put “market concentration”
in a favorable light measuring each firm’s market share as a percentage of the total potential customer
population and under the assumption that the firm selects an above rational price level.
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In this example, potential consumers in segment 1 (2) are entirely focused on firm 1
(2) and purchase the good or service as long as its price is below a consumer specific
reservation value. In contrast, consumers in market segment 3 are potentially attracted
by either firm. The purchase decisions of segment 3 customers are therefore based on
both firms’ pricing decisions. Following the derivation of (3.6) and (3.7), the demand





















The profit for each firm is given by πj = (pj − cj)Dj. The following set of parameters
specify a game without a Nash equilibrium: A = 4, B = 2, c1 = c2 = 1, N1 = 1, N2 = 2,
N3 = 3 and pj,max = 10. The following defines a cycle of best responses which is reached
from any starting point in the feasible price region [1,10]x[1,10], where br1(p2) denotes
the best response of firm 1 to firm 2’s price choice, p2, and vice versa for br2(p1):
br1(7.08) = 10; br2(10) = 8.79; br1(8.79) = 8.11; br2(8.11) = 7.08.
Notice that the parameters specified above violate condition C(1/2), as well as the dom-
inant diagonal condition specified in equation (3.20). However, the dominant diagonal
condition, while necessary for the uniqueness of an equilibrium, is not necessary for its
existence. The counterexample not only demonstrates the necessity of a condition like
C(1/2), but also reinforces the fact that the existence of a (unique) equilibrium can not
be taken for granted. With many structural estimation models relying on the existence of
a (unique) equilibrium when estimating market parameters and evaluating policies, it is
important to note that without an existence guarantee for an equilibrium, these methods
may result in flawed estimates.
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3.5 Extensions
In this section, we discuss several generalizations of the basic model.
3.5.1 Unequal Income or Firm Size Level
Thus far, we have assumed that all potential customers share the same income level Y .
Our equilibrium results carry over to the case of general income distributions provided
the price-income sensitivity functions Gj(·, ·) are separable, i.e.,





with G2j decreasing and concave. To model income or firm size heterogeneity, design the
market segmentation to be based, in part, on the income level such that all potential
customers in segment k = 1, . . . , K share the same income level Yk. This case is easily
handled under separable price-income sensitivity functions by replacing the term Ujk(xj)
in (3.1) by Ūjk(xj) = Ujk(xj) + G
1
j(Yk), and Gj(Yi, pj) by Ḡj(Yi, pj) = G
2(pj) for all
j = 1, . . . , J and k = 1, . . . , K. Since Ḡj(·, ·) does not depend on the income level, all
results in Section 3.3 continue to apply. If a continuous income distribution is required, a
model with a continuous rather than a finite set of customer types or segments is called
for. See the next subsection for a treatment of this case.
In the presence of income heterogeneity, it would clearly be of interest to extend
our results to settings where the price-income sensitivity functions fail to be separable,






level. More generally, one would like to extend our results to settings where the price-
income sensitivity functions themselves depend both on the firm and the customer segment
in general ways, i.e., not just via the customer’s income level. In other words, one
would like to generalize the consumer choice model (3.1) to allow for double-indexed
price-income sensitivity functions Gjk(Yk, pj), j = 1, . . . , J and k = 1, . . . , K. Such
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general dependencies on the customer segment have thus far failed to be tractable, see,
for example Caplin and Nalebuff (1991). Indeed, in Caplin and Nalebuff’s treatment of
the case of income heterogeneity, i.e., section 8.1, only linear price-income sensitivity
functions are allowed, see assumption A1 ibid11.
3.5.2 A Continuum of Customer Types
In some applications, a continuum of customer types need to be considered in the
consumer choice model. Our model is easily respecified to allow for a continuum of
customer types θ ∈ Θ, with a density function h(θ). As before, assume first that all
potential customers share the same income level Y; the generalization to arbitrary income
distributions is handled as in Subsection 3.5.1. Let:
uij(θ) = Uj(xj|θ) +Gj(Y, pj) + εij(θ), j = 1, . . . , J and i = 1, 2, . . . , (3.38)
ui0(θ) = U0(x1, . . . , xJ |θ) + εi0(θ), i = 1, 2, . . . . (3.39)
Here, uij denotes the utility value attributed by the i-th customer of type θ ∈ Θ, to
product j, j = 0, . . . , J , and for all j = 0, . . . , J and types θ ∈ Θ, {εij(θ)} represents a
sequence of independent random variables with Gumbel distributions. It is easily verified














All of the results in Section 3.3 continue to apply.
11Berry et al. (1995) appear, in the presence of income heterogeneity, to allow for a price-income
sensitivity function that is non-separable, i.e., gj(Yi, pj) = αlog(Yi − pj), see eq. (2-7a) ibid. As
mentioned in the Introduction, their footnote 12 suggests that only the multi-product feature of their
model precludes reliance on Caplin and Nalebuff (1991). In actuality, the choice of a non-separable price-
income sensitivity function provides a second reason why the existence results in Caplin and Nalebuff do
not apply to their model.
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3.5.3 The Multi-Product Case
In some settings, each firm j sells a series, say nj ≥ 1 of products in the market.
Assuming the choice model described by equations (3.1) and (3.2) applies to each of
the
∑J
j=1 nj products (and the no-purchase option), can simple and broadly applicable
conditions, similar to condition C(1/2), be identified under which the existence of a price
equilibrium is guaranteed for the general “multi-product” price competition model?
To address this question, identify each product by a double index (j, r) with the first
index denoting the product’s firm identity. Thus, for the r-th product of firm j, append
the double index (j, r) to each relevant variable and parameter. Analogous to (3.22),
define p̄jr(2) as the unique price level for product (j, r) for which
(pjr − cjr)gj(Y, pjr) = 2, j = 1, . . . , J, r = 1, . . . , nj. (3.41)
It is, again, possible to show that no firm j would choose to set all of its products’
prices at or above the {p̄jr(2) : r = 1, . . . , nj} levels, under a generalization of condition
C(1/2) which states that no firm’s total sales across all of its products exceeds 50% of
the potential market in any one market segment, under such price choices. However,
it is conceivable that a firm would choose some of its products’ prices to exceed their
p̄(2)-levels. Therefore, the proof of Theorem 3.3.2 cannot be generalized in a direct way.
At the same time, in Chapter 2 we showed that a Nash equilibrium, in fact a unique
equilibrium, exists if the maximum prices pmax ≤ p̄(1) with p̄jr(1) the unique price level
such that (pjr − cjr)gj(Y, pjr) = 1, j = 1, . . . , J r = 1, . . . , nj, see Section 2.5.
3.6 Structural Estimation Methods
In this section, we discuss the implications of our results for the econometrician desir-
ing to estimate the parameters of a model with MMNL demand function. Very often,
empiricists implicitly or explicitly “assume” that (I) the model possesses an equilibrium
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and (II) that any equilibrium, in particular the prevailing price vector (when observed),
satisfies the system of FOC (3.27)12. The problems arising due to the potential existence
of multiple equilibria or no equilibrium, have been featured prominently in recent papers,
as well as the fact that a solution to the system of FOC equations may fail to be an equi-
librium and vice versa. See, for example, Tamer (2003), Schmedders and Judd (2005),
Ferris et al. (2006), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)13, Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and
Dube et al. (2008b). Theorem 3.3.2 shows that under condition C(1/2) assumptions (I)
and (II) indeed apply.
In most applications, very high degrees of market concentration can be ruled out on a
priori grounds and condition C(1/2) may be assumed to hold upfront. One example is the
aforementioned drive-thru fast food industry, the industry modeled with MMNL demand
functions in both Thomadsen (2005a) and Chapter 2 of this dissertation: Elementary sta-
tistical studies reveal that even when aggregating across all chains, the fast food industry
captures a minority of the potential market in any relevant demographic segment. Going
forward, we distinguish between two types of estimation settings: estimation under an
observed prices vector and estimation absent price observations.
3.6.1 Structural Estimation With a Given Observed Price Vec-
tor
As reviewed in Section 3.1, in many structural estimation studies a specific price vector
p∗ is observed. Assumptions (I) and (II), mentioned above, are essential for the methods
to be used at all, because the structural estimation techniques rest on the assumption
that the observed prices represent a price equilibrium which is the solution to the sys-
tem of FOC equations (3.27). Condition C(1/2) confirms both assumptions. Moreover,
the model’s parameters are, invariably, determined by solving a mathematical program.
12See for example, the quote in the introduction of Berry et al. (1995)
13These authors note, for example: “The existence of multiple equilibria is a prevalent feature in most
empirical games where best response functions are nonlinear in other players’ actions. Models with
multiple equilibria do not have a unique reduced form, and this incompleteness may pose practical and
theoretical problems in the estimation of structural parameters.”
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(This applies both to the General Method of Moments and Maximum Likelihood Esti-
mation techniques, see e.g., Nevo (2000b).) As discussed above, high degrees of market
concentration can, quite frequently, be ruled out on a priori grounds and therefore con-
dition C(1/2) may be assumed to hold upfront. In such cases, in view of Lemma 3.3.1,





j − cj)gj(Y, p∗j) ≤ 2 = ωj(Y, p̄j(2)), j = 1, . . . , J, (3.42)
as they represent necessary conditions for an equilibrium when C(1/2) holds, no less than
the FOC equations (3.27) themselves14. This not only guarantees that the parameter
estimates are consistent with the observed price vector being an equilibrium, it improves
the estimation itself: As argued by Dube et al. (2008b) and Su and Judd (2008) for
general models, and in the specific model of Chapter 2 of this dissertation, much is
gained by restricting a numerically difficult search for optimal parameter values to its
relevant region via the addition of known necessary conditions. As mentioned, typically,
the price-income sensitivity functions Gj(·, ·) are specified within a given parametrized
family of functions, e.g., Gj(Y, pj) = g
1
j (Y )− αjpj, or Gj(Y, pj) = αjlog(Y − pj). In the
former case, (3.42) reduces to αj ≤ 2(p∗j−cj) and to αj ≤
(Y−p∗j )
(p∗j−cj)
in the latter. The marginal
cost vector c is sometimes known and sometimes part of the parameters that need to be
estimated. In the latter case, (3.42) represents a joint constraint on the parameter(s)
specifying the Gj(·, ·) function and the cj values.
Conversely, if the constraints (3.42) are not added to the mathematical program they
represent a useful test for the validity of obtained estimates: If some of the inequali-
ties in (3.42) are violated for the computed parameter estimates while condition C(1/2)
holds, the observed price vector fails to be an equilibrium under the computed parameter
estimates, see Lemma 3.3.1.
14Note that we do not propose adding condition C(1/2), via the inequalities (3.24), to the mathematical
program since C(1/2) represents a sufficient condition for existence only (albeit one that is very widely
satisfied).
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After the vector(s) of parameter estimates (and, if applicable, the estimate for c) are
obtained, it is useful to double-check whether condition C(1/2) is indeed satisfied. This
test reduces to making the JK numerical comparisons in (3.24) with µ = 1/2. If so,
the observed price vector p∗ is a (close approximation of a) Nash equilibrium under the
estimated parameter vector. If positive, the same test (3.24), with µ = 1/2 replaced by
µ = 1/3, guarantees that p∗ is in fact the unique equilibrium.15.
After the model parameters are estimated, most studies proceed to conduct coun-
terfactual investigations. To predict changes in the price equilibrium and corresponding
sales volumes resulting from a given change in one or several of the model’s parameters
it is important to know whether a unique equilibrium exists. The uniqueness conditions
in Theorem 3.3.3 can again be used for this purpose: as mentioned, the former reduces
to making the JK comparisons in (3.24) with µ = 1/3 using the estimated parameters,
while the latter reduces to the vector comparison pmax ≤ p̄(1).
If condition C(1/2) applies but condition C(1/3) fails, one may still be able to establish
that p∗ is the unique equilibrium, based on an ex post numerical test. After all, under
C(1/2), in view of Theorem 3.3.2, it suffices to verify that the system of FOC (3.27) has
the observed price vector p∗ as its unique solution on the cube XJj=1[p
min, pmax] under the
parameter estimates by employing any of the known algorithms that identify all solutions
to a system of equations. Thus, the characterization in parts (b) and (c) of Theorem 3.3.2
of the set of Nash equilibria as the solutions to (3.27) may be of great value in empirical
studies.
An alternative ex post uniqueness test, under C(1/2), is to verify that the single non-
linear function given by the determinant of the Jacobian matrix associated with (3.27)
has no root, i.e.,
detJ(p) 6= 0 ∀p ∈ XJj=1[ĉj, p̄j], (3.43)
15Of course, even if condition C(1/2) holds for the computed parameters θ̂, it is conceivable that, in
the absence of constraints (3.42) a different parameter vector θ′ would be found with a somewhat better
GMM norm or maximum likelihood value and with some of the constraints (3.42) violated. This can only
happen, in the rare case where condition C(1/2) is violated under θ′. In this case there is no guarantee
but it is possible that the observed price vector is an equilibrium under θ′ as well as under θ.
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where J(p) is an JxJ matrix with J(pmj) = ∂
2πm/∂pm∂pj. The validity of (3.43) follows
from Kellogg (1976). (Recall, Theorem 3.3.2 (b) excludes the existence of equilibria on
the boundary of the price region.)
3.6.2 Structural Estimation of the Game in the Absence of an
Observed Price Vector
In other studies, the parameters of the price competition game need to be estimated
in the absence of an observed price vector. This happens, for example, when estimat-
ing dynamic multi-stage games, see e.g., Doraszelski and Pakes (2007). Most estimation
methods consist of optimizing some objective L(θ, p(θ)) over all possible parameters vec-
tors θ and all price vectors p(θ) that arise as a Nash equilibrium under θ. The objec-
tive may be a maximum likelihood function or pseudo-maximum likelihood function, see
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007). Alternatively it may be a (generalized) method-
of-moments norm, see e.g. Pakes et al. (2004). The characterization of the equilibria p(θ)
as the solutions to the FOC equations (3.27) helps, once again, enormously for any of
these estimation methods: Traditional estimation methods, starting with Rust (1987)’s
(nested) fixed point algorithmic approach, have projected the associated optimization
problems onto the parameter space Θ; solving an optimization problem of the type:
min{L(θ, p(θ)|θ ∈ Θ and p(θ) is an equilibrium under θ}. (3.44)
This means that a search is conducted through the parameter space and whenever a
specific trial parameter vector θ̂ ∈ Θ is evaluated, all associated price equilibria p(θ̂)
are computed. As pointed out, for example by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), this
approach may be infeasible even for simple models. A further complication is that even
the computation of the equilibria p(θ), for any single parameter vector θ, may be very
difficult. Many, have concluded that games in which multiple equilibria may exist can not
be estimated, and have restricted themselves to model specifications in which uniqueness
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of the equilibrium can be guaranteed, at a minimum. An example of this approach is
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) in the context of empirical games of market entry. While
an “ideal” model would specify the profit function of a firm to be dependent on the
specific identity of the competitors, Bresnahan and Reiss addressed a specification where
it depends only on the number of competitors in the market, thus ensuring the existence
of a unique equilibrium, at the expense of ignoring the impact of heterogeneity. In
the context of our class of price competition models, an analogous approach would be
to suppress heterogeneity among customer preferences and to assume they all belong
to a single (homogeneous) market segment. Fortunately, no such model restrictions are
necessary. As pointed out by Dube et al. (2008b) and Su and Judd (2008), the prevalence
of multiple equilibria can comfortably be dealt with, as long as the set of equilibria can be
characterized as the solutions to a (closed form) set of equations like the FOC equations
(3.27). Within the context of our class of price competition models, this characterization
is obtained by Theorem 3.3.2. Instead of optimizing the projected unconstrained problem
(3.44), Theorem 3.3.2 permits us to estimate the parameters by solving the constrained
optimization problem:
min{L(p, θ) : θ ∈ Θ and (3.27)}. (3.45)
As explained above, if C(1/2) can be assumed on a priori grounds, in view of Lemma 3.3.1
constraints (3.42) could be added to (3.45); since these represent necessary conditions
under C(1/2),
min{L(p, θ) : θ ∈ Θ, (3.27) and (3.42)}. (3.46)
We refer to Section 3.6.1 for a discussion of how uniqueness of an equilibrium can be
guaranteed ex ante or confirmed ex post.
82
3.7 Acknowledgement




The impact of horizontal mergers
and acquisitions in price competition
models
We refer to Section 1.5 for an introduction and summary of the models used and results
obtained in this chapter. This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we give
a brief literature review. Section 4.2 presents our general model with some preliminar-
ies. The fundamental comparison results are obtained in Section 4.3, while section 4.4
describes the relationship between our results and the current discussion of the so-called
Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) measure as a proxy for the actual changes in equilibrium
prices, led by Farrell and Shapiro (2010a)1.
4.1 Literature Review
Few topics in industrial organization economic theory have been driven as intensively by
policy, legislations, and legal debates and innovation as the impact mergers and acquisi-
tions have on the market equilibrium. As mentioned Williamson (1968) appears to have
1Carl Shapiro is chief economist of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
Joseph Farrell is head of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
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been the first contribution to the literature in this area. The author demonstrated, with a
simple model, that even if a merger results in price increases, these may be accompanied
with reductions in marginal costs due to synergies. The combined effect on aggregate
surplus or welfare may therefore be positive in spite of universal price increases in the
industry. As elementary as this observation is in 2011, Williamson’s (1968) insights di-
rectly challenged prior court criteria in the U.S., attempting to apply anti-trust laws such
as the Clayton Act. For example, in the 1962 case of Brown Shoe vs. United States,
the court refused to entertain the argument that cost efficiencies arising from the merger
could result in increased welfare. In 1967, the Supreme Court went even further when
evaluating Procter and Gamble’s acquisition of Clorox. It argued that such cost synergies
should actually be viewed as an additional argument against the merger, in as much as
they result in additional profit and cash flow enhancements of the merged enterprise.
Prior to the eighties, the strategy literature posited that aggregate profits of merging
firms should increase even in the absence of any cost synergies, see e.g., Steiner (1975)
chapters 2 and 3. As mentioned in the Introduction, the first attempts to establish this
result in a formal oligopoly model are due to Salant et al. (1983), Szidarovszky and
Yakowitz (1982), and Davidson and Deneckere (1984). However, these papers found that
aggregate profits of merging firms may, in fact, decline. All three of these papers analyzed
the merger effects in the context of Cournot competition for a homogeneous good. Perry
and Porter (1985) countered that the enigmatic outcome in, for example, Salant et al.
(1983), is due to the authors ignoring cost synergies resulting from a merger in their
homogeneous Cournot model. These authors show that the aggregate profits of merging
firms are guaranteed to increase, if the cost synergies are sufficiently large.
Continuing to address Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous goods, Farrell and Shapiro
(1990) expanded the discussion to the impact mergers have on the equilibrium price. (In
a model with homogeneous goods, all products are sold for the same price.) Farrell and
Shapiro show that the equilibrium price increases under linear cost structures and in the
absence of cost synergies. These authors also derive a necessary and sufficient condition
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for a price increase under certain classes of non-linear cost functions and possible cost
synergies2.
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) made a seminal contribution to the discussion, show-
ing that all of the anticipated effects can be guaranteed in specific classes of (Bertrand-)
price competition models with differentiated goods: in the absence of cost synergies, equi-
librium prices are guaranteed to increase, the equilibrium profits of a merged enterprise
exceed the aggregate of the pre-merger profits of the merging firms while the equilibrium
profits of all other firms increase as well. The authors established these results in a sym-
metric model with linear demand and cost functions. (As mentioned in our Introduction,
in their appendix, the authors extend these results to non-linear demand functions, un-
der five conditions, the most important of which is that the industry is symmetrically
differentiated, see ibid.)
Thereafter, a few attempts have been made to generalize the Deneckere and Davidson
(1985) results to more general models, allowing for asymmetry among the firms or general
non-linear demand functions. Zhao and Howe (2010) generalize the Deneckre and David-
son results to models with linear demand and cost functions such that in each product’s
demand function the coefficient in front of the product’s own price is product specific but
a single uniform coefficient applies to all cross terms in all demand functions. Werden
and Froeb (1994) established these results for a model with multinomial logit demands
and linear costs; these authors applied the model to the U.S. market of long-distance
carriers, calculating the impact of various potential mergers. Levy and Reitzes (1992)
established the above results in a model where all consumers and all n firms are located
on a circle: each consumer patronizes the firm whose full price, consisting of a direct
price plus a travel cost proportional to the distance to the firm, is lowest. As mentioned
in the Introduction, the influential survey chapters by Whinston (2006, 2007) conjecture
that the results in Deneckere and Davidson should apply to general supermodular price
competition models, a conjecture our essay confirms under a few additional conditions.
2Unfortunately, the necessary and sufficient condition is stated in terms of the pre-merger and post-
merger equilibria outcomes rather than the primitives of the model
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As discussed, merger analysis has become a standard tool to evaluate the impact of
potential mergers, a trend stimulated by the development of effective structural econo-
metric methods for oligopoly models. Here, the demand and cost functions in a price
competition model are estimated. Thereafter, a counterfactual study is undertaken to es-
timate the price-, market share- and profit implications of a potential merger. Examples
include Werden and Froeb (1994) for the market for long distance carriers, Nevo (2000a)
for the ready-to-eat cereal industry, Dube (2005) for the soft drink industry and Thomad-
sen (2005a) for the fast-food drive thru industry in Santa Clara County. See Berry and
Pakes (1993) for a general discussion of the use of the above econometric methods to en-
able merger simulations and Baker and Bresnahan (1985) for an early application based
on more elementary estimation methods.
All of these merger simulation studies expect and confirm the above mentioned phe-
nomena in terms of increases in equilibrium prices and profits. We refer the reader to
section 4.4 for a review of the literature discussing alternatives to merger simulation, as
tools to approximate the impact of mergers and acquisitions.
Finally, we show in subsection 4.2 that the post-merger equlibrium depends in a sig-
nificant way on the specific structural form by which cost synergies impact the products’
cost functions. As described there, after any merger plan is announced, typically, high
level operational consultants are retained to characterize and quantify these synergies.
In spite of the enormous impact these synergy assessment projects have, little attention
has been devoted to this topic in the operations literature. Noted exceptions are Gupta
and Gerchak (2002) and Iyer and Jain (2004).
4.2 The Model
We initially consider an industry with N firms, each offering a single product to the
market. (In subsection 4.3 we generalize our results to industries with general multi-
product firms.) The expected demand volumes for these products depend on all product
87
prices according to a general system of demand equations. Each firm selects its price
level from a given, closed, price interval. The cost incurred by each firm depends on its
sales volume according to a given, possibly nonlinear, cost function. We characterize the
impact of a merger of several of the firms, without loss of generality the first I firms, with
2 ≤ I ≤ N . Thus, for each firm i, i = 1, . . . , N , let
pi = the price selected;
pmini (p
max
i ) = the minimum (maximum) feasible price;
di(p) = di(p1, . . . , pN) = the expected sales volume;
Ci(di) = the total cost incurred by firm i, specified as a differentiable function of its sales
volume.
We use the common notation, p−i, to denote the (N-1)-dimensional vector of prices per-
taining to all but firm i’s prices. Similarly, we denote by p−I , the (N-I)-dimensional price
vector (pI+1, ...pN).
We consider fully general differentiable demand functions, merely assuming, without
loss of generality, that:
∂di
∂pi
≤ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , N and ∂di
∂pj
≥ 0 ∀i 6= j (4.1)
i.e., each product’s demand function is downward sloping in its own price and nonde-
creasing in any of the competing products’ prices.
As to the price bounds, {pmini } and {pmaxi } we assume that they are set loosely enough
as to be non-binding whenever a firm determines the best response to a given set of
choices by the competitors. We impose these bounds merely to ensure that the feasible
price range for each product is a compact set.
The expected profit function of each firm when operating by itself, is thus given by
πi(p) = pidi(p)− Ci(di(p)), i = 1, . . . , N (4.2)
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In this section, we assume that when the first I firms merge, this merger does not result
in any cost savings, i.e., the I products continue to be procured in the pre-merger way,
so that the cost function of the merged firm is given by Cm(p) =
∑I
i=1Ci(di(p)). The











We assume that the profit functions exhibit the following two properties:
(Q) (Quasi-Concavity) Each firm i’s profit function πi(p) is strictly quasi-concave in its
own price variable pi, i = 1, . . . , N .
(S) (Strategic Complementarity)
(i) For all i = 1, . . . , N the profit function πi(pi, p−i) is supermodular in every price
pair (pi, pj) with j 6= i.
(ii) The profit function of the merged firm πm(p1, . . . , pN) is supermodular in each
price pair (pi, pj) with i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , N , and i 6= j.
Condition (S) has been used, with regularity, in the literature. See, for example, Cabral
and Villas-Boas (2005). Vives (1985, 1990) identified broad sufficient conditions in terms
of the demand functions and cost structures which guarantee that conditions (Q) and
(S.i) are satisfied simultaneously: Assume, the demand functions are twice differentiable
and that, for example, each firm has an increasing and convex cost function Ci(.), di(p)
is log-concave while ∂
2logdi
∂pipj
≥ 0,∀j 6= i, i.e., di is log-supermodular in every price pair
(pi, pj) with j 6= i. (See remark 2 on p. 156 of Vives (2001).)
It is harder to identify sufficient conditions for property (S.ii), i.e., for the supermodu-
larity of the profit function of a merged firm in terms of simple structural properties of the
individual products’ cost and demand functions. However, condition (S.ii) is easily veri-
fied directly. This applies, in particular, when the profit functions are twice differentiable,
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in which case (S.ii) is equivalent to
∂2πm
∂pi∂pj
≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , I and ∀j 6= i, on the price cube XNl=1[pminl , pmaxl ]. (4.4)
As shown in Section 4.1, one special, but frequently applied, case in which conditions (Q)
and (S) can be guaranteed upfront is when all demand and cost functions are affine.
4.3 Pre- and Post-Merger Comparison
In this section, we describe our main results. In particular we show that in the absence
of cost synergies, both the component-wise smallest and largest post-merger price equi-
libria are larger than their pre-merger counterparts. This implies that consumer welfare
declines due to the merger. In addition, all firms’ equilibrium profits increase, with the
understanding that we compare the profits of the newly merged firm with the aggregate
of their pre-merger profits. We distinguish between the following two games, describing
the competition in the industry before and after the merger:
Γpre {A1 . . . AI ; [π1, π2, . . . , πN ]; i = 1, . . . , N}: This is the pre-merger N firm competition
game in which each of the N firms operates as an independent competitor; firm




i ] and faces the profit
function πi.
Γpost {Xl∈IAl, AI + 1, . . . , AN ; [πm, πI+1, . . . , πN ]; i = m, I + 1, . . . , N} refers to the post-
merger game, with (N-I+1) players, the merged firm m and firms I+1, . . . , N . The
merged firm selects its I-dimensional price vector from the price cube XIl=1Al and
faces the profit function πm. The remaining firms i = I + 1, ..., N have the same
feasible action space and profit functions as in the pre-merger game.
In addition, we define the following set of restricted games for any vector of prices p◦−I =
(p◦I+1, ..., p
◦
N), pertaining to the firms not involved in the merger:
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Γres(p◦−I) = {A1, . . . , AI ; πresi (p1, ...pI |p◦−I); i = 1, . . . , I}, where
πresi (p1, ...pI |p◦−I) ≡ πi(p1, ...pI , p◦−I), i = 1, . . . , I (4.5)
These games have the first I firms as independent players, each with his feasible price
interval as his action space and a profit function obtained from the profit function in the
unrestricted pre-merger game by fixing the prices of the remaining firms I + 1, ..., N at
their levels in the vector p◦−I . We first need the following lemma:
Lemma 4.3.1
(a) The games Γpre,Γpost, and Γres(p◦−I),for any price vector p
◦
−I ∈ XNl=I+1Al are
all supermodular and have a component-wise smallest equilibrium, which we denote by
p∗(pre),p∗(post), and p∗(p◦−I) respectively. They also have a component-wise largest equi-
librium, denoted by p̄∗(pre),p̄∗(post), and p̄∗(p◦−I).
(b) For each firm i = 1, . . . , N , there exists a unique best response Ψi(p−i) for any feasible
price vector p−i ∈ Xl 6=iAl.
(c) In the post-merger game, Γpost, the merged firm m has a component-wise smallest
[largest] best response function price vector, Ψm(p−I) [Ψ̄
m(p−I)] = (p1, . . . , pI), for any
price vector p−I ∈ XNl=I+1Al.
Proof: (a) All of the considered games have continuous profit functions and actions
spaces that are lattices, either simple closed intervals or, for the merged firm in the game
Γpost, the cube XIl=1Al . To establish the supermodularity of the various games, it there-
fore suffices to verify that the players’ profit functions have the required supermodularity
properties. For the games Γpre and Γres(p◦−I) this is immediate from condition (S.i). In
the game Γpost, each firm i = I + 1, . . . , N has the same profit function πi as in Γ
pre and
this profit function is supermodular in (pi, pj) for all j 6= i. Finally, in the game Γpost, the
merged firm m has profit function πm which is supermodular in (pi, pj) for all i = 1, . . . , I
and all j = 1, . . . , N with j 6= i by condition (S.ii). Since the games are supermodular, it
follows that they have a component-wise smallest and a component-wise largest equilib-
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rium, see e.g., Theorem 4.2.1 in Topkis (1998).
(b) This result follows from the strict quasi-concavity of each profit function πi in its
own-price variable pi, i = 1, . . . , N , see condition (Q).
(c) Part (c) follows from Lemma 4.2.2 (c) in Topkis (1998) and the supermodularity of
Γpost by part (a).

As is well known, one of the implications of a game being supermodular is that its
component-wise smallest equilibrium can be computed by a simple tatônnement scheme
which starts with the vector pmin, the component-wise smallest element of the feasible
price space3. In such tatônnement schemes, the players iteratively determine best re-
sponses to choices made by their competitors in earlier iterations of the scheme. There
is considerable flexibility in terms of the sequence in which best response updates are
made. Topkis (1998) and Vives (2001) focus on the so-called simultaneous optimization
and Round-Robin versions. In the former, all players determine (simultaneously) in each
iteration, their best responses to the choices made in the prior iteration with a specific rule
determining which best response is selected when the best response fails to be unique. In
the Round-Robin version, one chooses a particular permutation of the players; following
this permutation, each player is sequentially offered the opportunity to adopt his best
response to the most recent choices made by all competitors.
Our first main result is to show that the component-wise smallest and largest equi-
librium in the post-merger game are (component-wise) larger than the corresponding
equilibria in the pre-merger game. Our proof is based on identifying pairs of specific
tatônnement schemes one of which pertains to the post-merger game and one to the
pre-merger game, such that in each iteration the price vector determined in the post-
merger tatônnement scheme dominates that obtained in the pre-merger scheme, while
the pre-merger scheme converges to a specific equilibrium in the pre-merger game, and
the post-merger scheme converges to its counterpart in the post-merger game. This proof
3The same property applies to the component-wise largest equilibrium, starting the tatônnement
scheme at the largest feasible price vector pmax.
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technique is reminiscent of that employed in Allon and Federgruen (2007).
To show that p∗(post) ≥ p∗(pre) and p̄∗(post) ≥ p̄∗(pre), we use the following pairs of
schemes, respectively:
• Pre-Merger Increasing Scheme
– Step 0: p(0) := pmin; k = 1
– Step 1: For i = 1,...,I, set (p
(k)
1 , ..., p
(k)
I ) = p
∗(p
(k−1)
−I ) the smallest equilibrium
of the game Γres(p
◦(k−1)
−I )




−i ); k = k+1 and repeat Step 1.
• Post-Merger Increasing Scheme
– Step 0: q(0) := pmin; k = 1
– Step 1: For i = 1,...,I, set (q
(k)
1 , . . . , q
(k)








−i ); k = k+1 and repeat Step 1.
• Pre-Merger Decreasing Scheme
– Step 0: p̃(0) := pmax; k = 1
– Step 1: For i = 1,...,I, set (p̃
(k)
1 , ..., p̃
(k)
I ) = p̄
∗(p̃
(k−1)








−i ); k := k+1 and repeat Step 1.
• Post-Merger Decreasing Scheme
– Step 0: q̃(0) := pmax; k = 1
– Step 1: For i = 1,...,I, set (q̃
(k)
1 , . . . , q̃
(k)








−I ); k = k+1 and repeat Step 1.
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Lemma 4.3.2 (a) The sequence {p(k)}∞k=1 increases monotonically to p∗(pre).
(b) The sequence {q(k)}∞k=1 increases monotonically to p∗(post).
(c) The sequence {p̃(k)}∞k=1 decreases monotonically to p̄∗(pre).
(d) The sequence {q̃(k)}∞k=1 decreases monotonically to p̄∗(post).
Proof: (a) We first show, by induction, that the sequence {p(k)}∞k=1 is monotonically
increasing. Clearly p(1) ≥ p(0) = pmin. Assume p(k−1) ≥ p(k−2) for some k ≥ 2. For





i ) ≥ Ψi(p
(k−2)
i ) = p
(k−1)
i (4.6)
where the inequality follows from the induction assumption and the fact that in a su-
permodular game the Ψi(·) operator is increasing, for all i, see Lemma 4.2.2 in Topkis




1 , . . . , p
(k)
I ) = p
∗(p
(k−1)
−I ) ≥ p
∗(p
(k−2)
−I ) = (p
(k−1)
1 , . . . , p
(k−1)
I ), (4.7)
where the inequality follows again from the induction assumption, as well as from the
fact that the smallest equilibrium in the supermodular, restricted game Γres(p◦−I) is an
increasing function of any of the parameters in p◦−I since, for all i = 1, . . . , I, each firm i’s
payoff function in these restricted games is continuous and supermodular in (pi, pj) for
all j = I + 1, . . . , N (see Theorem 4.2.2 in Topkis (1998)).
(4.6) and (4.7) together establish that p(k) ≥ p(k−1), thus completing the induction
proof for the monotonicity of scheme {p(k)} which is bounded from above by pmax and
hence converges to a limit vector p∗. By the continuity of the profit functions, p∗ is
a fixed point of the joint best response operator in the pre-merger game, i.e., p∗ is an
equilibrium of the game Γpre.
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It remains to be shown that p∗ = p∗(pre), the component-wise smallest equilibrium
of Γpre, i.e., p∗ ≤ p∗(pre). To prove this inequality, consider for any precision ε > 0, the
following ε-approximation of the Pre-Merger Increasing Scheme:
Approximate Pre-Merger Increasing Scheme (APMIS):
• Step 0: x(0) := pmin; l:=1
• Step 1: (Best response for firms I+1,...,N)









l = l + 1
• Step 2: (Best response for firms 1,...,I)









l = l + 1
If |x(l) − x(l−1)|∞ ≤ ε, go to Step1, otherwise, go to Step 2.
Note that when APMIS executes a batch of consecutive Step 2 iterations, an (ε-
approximation) of the smallest equilibrium in the restricted game Γres(·) is being com-
puted, given the most recently updated prices for the firms I + 1, . . . , N . Thus, modulo
the ε-approximation in the stopping criterion of Step 2, each time APMIS reenters Step
1, a new element of the sequence {p(k)} in the Pre-Merger Increasing Scheme is being
generated. Thus, the scheme {x(l)}∞l=1 converges to an ε-approximation x∗(ε) of the limit
vector p∗ of the scheme {p(k)}∞k=1. Moreover, by the continuity of the profit functions,
limε↓0x
∗(ε) = p∗.
To show that p∗ ≤ p∗(pre), it thus suffices to show that x∗(ε) ≤ p∗(pre). This inequal-
ity follows by comparing the sequence {x(l)} with {y(l)}∞l=1, the scheme generated by the
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“simultaneous optimization” variant of the tatônnement scheme in the pre-merger game
Γpre, when, like {x(l)}, starting at the smallest feasible price vector pmin. As mentioned in
the proof of part (a), since all profit functions in the pre-merger game are continuous and
the firm’s feasible action sets compact, it follows from Theorem 4.3.4 in Topkis (1998)
that this simultaneous optimization tatônnement scheme {y(l)}∞l=1 converges to p∗(pre).
Moreover, x(l) ≤ y(l) for all l = 1,2,..., since the simultaneous optimization tatônnement
scheme {y(l)}∞l=1, executes, in each iteration, a version of Step 1 or Step 2 in which all
firms are permitted to update their price to a larger best response value, as opposed to
APMIS, where only firms I + 1, . . . , N [1, . . . , I] in Step 1 [Step 2] are permitted to do
so while the remaining firms 1, . . . , I [I + 1, . . . , N ] forced to set their price level at the
minimum [previous] level. Thus, the inequalities x(l) ≤ y(l), l = 1, 2, ... follow by complete
induction, employing the fact that the profit functions are supermodular.
(b) The sequence {q(k)}∞k=1 is the sequence generated by the “simultaneous optimiza-
tion” variant of the tatônnement scheme, applied to the game Γpost and starting at pmin.
By Lemma 4.3.1(a), the game Γpost is supermodular. Since the payoff functions in this
game are continuous and the action sets of all players compact, it follows from Theorem
4.3.4 in Topkis (1998) that the scheme {q(k)}∞k=1 converges to p∗(post).
(c) and (d): The proofs of parts (c) and (d) are analogous to those of parts (a) and
(b), respectively. 
In addition to the quasi-concavity and strategic complementarity conditions (Q) and
(S) we need one additional assumption to allow for comparison of pre- and post-merger
prices:
(MP) (Marginal Profitability for the Merged Firm) For any set of prices p◦−I selected by
firms I + 1, . . . , N , the best response Ψm(p◦−I) = (p1, . . . , pI) employs price levels
that are larger than the products’ marginal costs, i.e., pi ≥ C ′i(di) for i = 1, . . . , I.
This condition is entirely innocuous when the cost functions are affine: in this case, we
may, without loss of generality select pmin ≥ c, the constant marginal cost rate vector.
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When the cost functions are non-linear, the Marginal Profitability condition (MP) may
be somewhat restrictive, but can still be argued to apply in most settings.
Indeed, the following is a frequently used sufficient condition for the Marginal Prob-
ability condition (MP):
(CM) (Competitive Markets): For all i = 1, . . . , N, πi(pi, p−i) is increasing in p−i.
The (CM) condition has been postulated, for example by Milgrom and Roberts (1990)
as well as Cabral and Villas-Boas (2005). The former pointed out that under the super-
modularity condition (S.i), (CM) reduces to assuming that for all i = 1, . . . , N , firm i’s
profit πi(p
min
i , p−i) is increasing in competitors’ prices, when charging at its minimum
price level. (Since πi is supermodular in (pi, pj) for all j 6= i, it has increasing differences
in every such price pair, i.e.,, πi(pi, p
′







j)−πi(pmini , pj) ≥ 0⇒ πi(pi, p′j)−πi(pi, pj) ≥ 0 for all pi ≥ pmini .)
Lemma 4.3.3 Under condition (S.i), (CM) ⇒ (MP).
Proof: By (CM) we have, in every price point p ∈ XNl=1Al, for all i 6= j that ∂πi∂pj =
(pi − C ′(di)) ∂di∂pj ≥ 0. In view of (4.1) this implies that for all i = 1, . . . , N pi ≥ C
′
i(di),
with di = di(p) for any feasible price vector p, and, in particular, when the prices of the
first I products are selected as best responses. 
We now derive our first main result, i.e., we show that both the largest and smallest
equilibria in the post-merger game dominate, component-wise, their counterparts in the
pre-merger game.
Theorem 4.3.4 (Pre- and Post-Merger Price Comparisons) Assume conditions (Q),
(S), and (CM) apply.
The post-merger equilibrium p∗(post) [p̄∗(post)] is component-wise larger than the pre-
merger equilibrium p∗(pre) [p̄∗(pre)], i.e., p∗(post) ≥ p∗(pre) and p̄∗(post) ≥ p̄∗(pre).
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Proof: We show that p∗(post) ≥ p∗(pre); the comparison proof for the largest equilibrium
in the post- and pre-merger game is entirely analogous. In view of Lemma 4.3.2, it
suffices to show that in each iteration k = 0, 1, . . . , q(k) ≥ p(k). We prove this by
induction. The starting conditions of the two schemes have q(0) = p(0), so that the
statement holds for k=0. Assume it holds after the (k-1)st iteration, i.e., q(k−1) ≥ p(k−1).
For firms i = I + 1, . . . , N , q
(k)
i = Ψi(q
(k−1)) ≥ Ψi(p(k−1)) = p(k)i is immediate from the
supermodularity condition (S.i), see, for example, Lemma 4.2.2c in Topkis (1998).




i for i = 1, . . . , I. Since p
min and pmax
are selected so as not to impact on the best response price choices in either the pre- or
post-merger industry, we have that the price vector (q
(k)
1 , . . . , q
(k)
I ) is an interior point
of the price space and therefore satisfies the following First Order Conditions. For all
















































I+1 , . . . , q
(k−1)
N ). By the marginal profitability condition (MP),
we have for all l = 1, . . . , i − 1, i, i + 1, . . . , I that q(k)l ≥ C ′l(dl), while
∂dl
∂pi
≥ 0, see (4.1).
Thus, for all i = 1, . . . , I,
∂πi(q
(k)









By the strict quasi-concavity of the profit functions {πi, i = 1, . . . , I} it follows that
Ψi(q
(k)




I+1 , . . . , q
(k−1)
N ) ≤ q
(k)
i , i = 1, . . . , I (4.10)
Consider now the restricted game Γres(q
(k−1)
−I ). This game is supermodular by Lemma
4.3.1. Let Ψres(x) denote the I-dimensional joint best response vector of the I competing
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firms in the game Γres(q
◦(k−1)
−I ) to an assumed price vector x = (x1, . . . , xI):
Ψresi (x) ≡ Ψi(x1, . . . , xI , q
(k−1)
I+1 , . . . q
(k−1)
N ), i = 1, . . . , N (4.11)
In addition, for all n = 1,2,... let Ψres(n)(·) denote the n-fold application of the best
response operator Ψres. (4.10) implies that Ψres(q
(k)
1 , ..., q
(k)
I ) ≤ [q
(k)
1 , ..., q
(k)
I ]. Since the
game Γres(q
(k−1)
−I ) is supermodular, it follows that the best response operator Ψ
res(·) is
monotonically increasing. Hence,
pmin ≤ Ψres(m)(q(k)1 , ..., q
(k)
I ) ≤ Ψ
res(m−1)(q
(k)
1 , ..., q
(k)
I ) ≤ Ψ
res(q
(k)
1 , ..., q
(k)
I ) ≤ [q
(k)




It follows that the monotonically decreasing and bounded sequence {Ψres(n)(q(k)1 , ..., q
(k)
I )}∞n=1
converges to a limit vector q∗, with
[p
(k)
1 , ..., p
(k)
I ] = p ∗ (p
(k−1)
−I ) ≤ p ∗ (q
(k−1)
−I ) ≤ q∗ ≤ [q
(k)
1 , ..., q
(k)
I ], (4.13)
thus completing the induction proof. The first inequality in (4.13) follows from the
fact that the smallest equilibrium in a supermodular game is a monotonically increasing
vector-function of any parameter (string) such that each player’s payoff function in the
game is continuous and supermodular in the player’s action variable and the parameter,
see Theorem 4.2.2 in Topkis (1998). This supermodularity property follows from condition
(S.i).
Thus, to complete the verification of the string of inequalities in (4.13) only the second
inequality remains to be substantiated. However, this inequality follows from the fact
that q∗ = limn→∞Ψ
res(n)(q
(k)
1 , ..., q
(k)
I ) is an equilibrium of the game Γ
res(q
(k−1)
−I ) and hence
dominates p∗(q
(k−1)
−I ) the component-wise smallest equilibrium of this game. The fact that
q∗ is an equilibrium of this game follows from Theorem 2.10 in Vives (2001) since the
game Γres(q
(k−1)
−I ) is supermodular with continuous payoff functions. 
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We now show that, beyond generating higher equilibrium prices, the merger also
results in equilibrium profits for the merged firm that are larger than the aggregate of the
pre-merger profits among the I merging firms. Moreover, and perhaps most surprisingly,
the remaining (N-I) firms also earn a higher expected profit after the merger. We establish
these results under the (CM) condition, the stronger version of (MP) as shown in Lemma
4.3.3.
We show that these profit comparison results apply, both to the largest and smallest
equilibria in the pre-merger and post-merger games. The comparison results are, in
particular, important for the largest equilibrium, since it is well known from Theorem
7 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990), that under conditions (S) and (CM) the component-
wise largest equilibrium is simultaneously preferred by all firms in the industry. Thus, if
multiple equilibria exist, it is most plausible that the largest equilibrium will be adopted.
For all firms i = I + 1, . . . , N , let π̄i(post) [πi(post)] denote the equilibrium profit in
the post-merger game under the largest [smallest] equilibrium. Similarly, define for all
i = 1, . . . , N , π̄i(pre) [πi(pre)] as the corresponding equilibrium profit values in the pre-
merger game. In addition, let π̄m(post) [πm(post)] denote the merged firm’s equilibrium
profit in the post-merger game under the largest [smallest] equilibrium.
Theorem 4.3.5 (Profit Comparison Before and After the Merger)










π̄i(post) ≥ π̄i(pre), i = I + 1, . . . , N (4.17)
Proof: (a) For i = I + 1, . . . , N : πi(pre) = πi(p






(post), p∗−i(post)) = πi(post) thus proving (4.15).
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The first inequality follows from p∗−i(post) ≥ p
∗
−i(pre), see Theorem 4.3.4, and the (CM)
condition; the second equality follows from p∗
i
(post) being a best response to p∗−i(post),

















πm(post), verifying (4.14). The first inequality follows again from p∗(post) ≥ p∗(pre), see
Theorem 4.3.4(a), and the (CM) condition; the second inequality follows from the fact
that the vector (p∗
1
(post), . . . , p∗
I
(post)) is a best response price vector for the merged firm
to prices p∗−I(post) selected by the remaining firms I + 1, . . . , N .
(b) The proof of part (b) is analogous to that of part (a). 
4.3.1 Affine Demand and Cost Functions
In this subsection we apply our results to the special case where both the demand and
cost functions are affine, but otherwise general, i.e.,
di(p) = ai − bipi +
∑
j 6=i
βijpj, i = 1, . . . , N (4.18)
Ci(di) = cidi + ei, i = 1, . . . , N (4.19)
where {ai, bi, βij, ci, ei} are given parameters with bi, βij ≥ 0. This structure is used in
many applications. Without loss of generality, assume each product is priced at or above
its marginal cost value, i.e., pmini = ci for all i = 1, . . . , N . It is easily verified that all
three of the conditions (Q), (S), and (MC) are satisfied. This implies that both the pre-
merger and post-merger games are supermodular. Assume, in addition, that the price
















≤ 0⇔ bi ≥
∑
j 6=i βji, i = 1, . . . , N
These conditions are very intuitive: (D) states that a uniform price increase for all firms
cannot result in an increase of any product’s sales volume; (D2) states that if any prod-
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uct’s price is increased, unilaterally, aggregate sales in the industry do not increase. Under
the dominant diagonality conditions, we have that both the pre-merger and post-merger
games have a unique equilibrium p∗(pre) and p∗(post), respectively. This follows from
the fact that the Jacobian of the system of First Order Conditions is a dominant diag-
onal matrix, see Vives (2001) and Gabay and Moulin (1980). The following corollary is
therefore immediate from Theorems 4.3.4 and 4.3.5.
Corollary 4.3.6 Consider an industry with affine demand and cost functions (4.19,
4.18). Assume in addition that the dominant diagonality conditions (D1,D2) hold.
(a) There exists a unique equilibrium p∗(pre) in the pre-merger game, and a unique equi-
librium p∗(post) in the post-merger game with p∗(pre) ≤ p∗(post).
(b) The equilibrium profits of the merged firm exceed the aggregate equilibrium pre-merger
profits of the merging firms. Similarly, the equilibrium profits of all remaining firms in-
crease because of the merger:








πi(post) ≡ πi(p∗(post)) ≥ πi(p∗(pre)) ≡ πi(pre), i = I + 1, . . . , N
4.3.2 Cost Efficiencies Resulting from the Merger
Thus far, we have assumed that the merger does not affect the cost structure of the
products offered by the merging firms. Frequently, mergers result in significant cost
synergies. Indeed, such synergies are often the driving force, or one of the principal
impetuses, behind the merger. For example, in 2005 Proctor & Gamble announced the
largest acquisition in its history, agreeing to buy Gillette in a $57 billion stock deal. The
acquisition presented P&G with the opportunity to become the leader in the household
and personal care market. The merging firms had reported 2004 profits of $6.5 billion and
$1.6 billion, respectively. In the traditional “freeze” period following the merger proposal,
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AT Kearney was retained to assess the cost synergies. (Such assessments by independent
consulting firms are routinely undertaken in any significant merger proposal.) The firm
estimated the cost synergies at approximately $1 billion per year; over half the size of
the total pre-merger profits of Gillette.
While reduced competition results in price increases, see Theorem 4.3.4, it is generally
believed that cost synergies have the opposite effect. In actuality, whether this can be
guaranteed or not depends on the specific way the synergies impact on the cost functions
of the products being merged. The simplest synergy model assumes that each of the
marginal cost functions is shifted by the same constant σ > 0, i.e.,
Cposti (di) = Ci(di)− σdi, i = 1, . . . , I (4.20)
The pre-merger and post-merger cost functions may be viewed as special cases of a
parameterized set of functions Ci(di, σ) = Ci(di)−σdi, with the pre-merger [post-merger]
cost function corresponding with σ = 0 [σ = 1].
Proposition 4.3.7 Assume the merger induces synergies for the cost structures of
products i = 1, . . . , I, as described by (4.20). Assume, in addition, that the dominant
diagonal condition (D1) applies. These synergies result in price decreases for the smallest
and largest post-merger equilibrium compared to their levels in the absence of any cost
synergies.
Proof: By Theorem 4.2.2 in Topkis (1998), it suffices to show that ∂
2πm
∂pi∂σ
≥ 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , I while for all i = I + 1, . . . , N ∂πi
∂pi∂σ
















} > 0 by the dominant diagonal condition (D1). 
Thus, a merger associated with cost synergies described by a uniform marginal cost re-
duction as in (4.20), induces two opposite effects. The “increased market concentration”,
by itself, increases the price equilibrium; however, the cost synergies induce decreases in
all equilibrium prices. Which of the two effects dominates, depends on the magnitude
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of σ. This phenomenon was first observed by Deneckere and Davidson (1985) in their
special class of Bertrand price competition models.
It should be noted that the price effects described by Proposition 4.3.7 are specific
to a uniform reduction of the marginal cost functions of products 1, . . . , I by the same
constant. If the marginal cost reduction is product specific, i.e., Cposti (di) = Ci(di)− σidi,
or if it fails to be constant, i.e., Cposti (di) = Ci(di) − σ(di) for some non-linear function
σ(·), it does not appear to be possible to guarantee a reduction of the equilibrium prices
as compared to a post-merger equilibrium without such synergies4.
Returning to the synergy structure (4.20), two values of interest are:
σ+ = min{σ : p∗(post|σ) ≤ p∗(pre)}, and
σ− = min{σ : p∗i (post|σ) < p∗i (pre) for some i = 1, . . . , N} ≤ σ+,
where p∗(post|σ) denotes the equilibrium in the post-merger game under a given marginal
cost savings σ. In other words, σ+(σ−) denotes the minimum cost savings such that all
(at least one) of the equilibrium prices decreases after the merger.
In assessing whether the proposed merger is likely to “lessen competition” one may
then evaluate whether the magnitude of σ−(σ+) is a realistic possibility. (Both σ− and
σ+ can easily be computed by embedding the tatônnement scheme in a bi-section search
for the “break even” value of σ.)
Alternatively, one may assume that the merger results in a marginal cost reduction
of one of the products of the merging firms only, and calculate σ+ on this basis. This
approach was followed, for example, by Nevo (2000a) for the ready-to-eat cereal indus-
try. After carefully estimating the demand functions of the different ready-to-eat cereal
products, Nevo (2000a) simulates various potential pairwise mergers among the six major
national competitors. In his Table 5, the author reports the price increases that result
from various potential mergers, assuming that the cost functions remain unaltered. Table
6 proceeds to report what marginal cost reductions for individual products would restore
4Farrell and Shapiro (2010a) for example assume that the cost synergies result in a uniform percentage
reduction of the marginal costs. Their Proposition 1, confining itself to a merger of two firms, indeed
states as an assumption “Suppose that the price charged by the merged firm for each product and
non-decreasing in the marginal cost of the other product”.
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the equilibrium prices to levels at or below the pre-merger values. These “break even”
values are then discussed to evaluate whether the net effect of the merger is likely to be
positive or negative.
4.3.3 Mergers of multi-product firms
In our base model, we consider a (pre-merger) industry in which each of the products is
sold by an independent company. In this subsection we extend our results to the more
prevalent case where some or all of the existing firms sell more than one product. (We
continue to assume that each product is sold by a single firm.) We characterize the
equilibrium consequences of a merger between two of these firms.
Assume there are n firms in the industry, numbered i = 1, . . . , n with firm i offering
li ≥ 1 products to the market, with N =
∑n
i=1 li. We thus use a double index to
differentiate among the various products, with product (i, j) referring to the j-th product
offered by firm i, i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , li. For firm i, let pi = (pi1, . . . , pil) denote
the firm’s price vector and let p denote the N -dimensional vector containing all prices for





Without loss of generality, assume firms 1 and 2 merge to create a new merged firm m
with profit function
πm(p) = π1(p) + π2(p) (4.22)
(As in the base model, we initially assume that the merger leaves all cost functions
unaltered.) To ensure that both the pre-merger Γpre and the post-merger game Γpost are
supermodular we need a variant of condition (S):
(Sm): (Strategic Complementarity)
(i) For all i = 1, . . . , n, the profit function πi(pi, p−i) is a supermodular function of
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the vector pi and has increasing differences with respect to p−i.
(ii) The profit function of the merged firm, πm(p1, . . . , pn) is a supermodular func-
tion of (p1, p2) and has increasing differences with respect to the remaining prices
p−{1,2} = (p3, . . . , pn).
Along with the fact that all n firms in the pre-merger game Γpre and all n− 1 firms in
the post-merger game Γpost have action spaces that are compact lattices, condition (Sm)
guarantees that both games are supermodular. Similarly, we need a slight variant of the
quasi-convexity condition (Q):
(Qm): The profit functions πi(p1, p2, . . . , pn) are strictly quasi-concave functions of firm
i’s price vector pi, i = 1, . . . , n.
As in the base model, we need to consider restricted versions of the pre-merger game
in which only firms 1 and 2 are able to vary their price vectors, under given price choices
p−{1,2} ≡ (p3, . . . , pn) for the remaining firms. We refer to this restricted duopoly as
Γres(p−{1,2}.
In view of the strict quasi-concavity condition (Qm), each firm i = 1, . . . , N has
a unique best response Ψi(p−i) to any given choice of prices by the remaining firms.
In view of the supermodularity condition (Sm), the merged firm has a component-wise
smallest [largest] best response Ψm(p−{1,2}) [Ψ̄
m(p−{1,2})] to any given price vector p−{1,2}
of the remaining firms i = 1, . . . , N .
As before, let p∗(pre) and p̄∗(pre) [p∗(post) and p̄∗(post)] denote the component-
wise smallest and largest equilibrium in the pre-merger [post-merger] game. Let πi(pre),
π̄i(pre) (i = 1, . . . , n) and πi(post), π̄i(post) (i = 1, . . . , n) (i = 3, . . . , n) denote the
associated profit values. Finally, πm(post) and π̄m(post) denote the profit values of the
merged firm in these two equilibria of Γpost.
Theorem 4.3.8 (Price and Profit Comparisons for Mergers of Multi-Product Firms)
Assume conditions (Qm),(Sm), and (CM) hold.
(a) p∗(pre) ≤ p∗(post) and p̄∗(pre) ≤ p̄∗(post)
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(b) πm(post) ≥ π1(pre) + π2(pre)
π̄m(post) ≥ π̄1(pre) + π̄2(pre)
πi(post) ≥ πi(pre), i = 3, . . . , n
π̄i(post) ≥ π̄i(pre), i = 3, . . . , n
Proof: (a) We show p∗(pre) ≤ p∗(post), the comparison of the pair of largest price
equilibrium being analogous. The proof goes along the lines of those of Theorem 4.3.3
and 4.3.4. Define the following pair of tailored tatônnement schemes:
Pre-Merger Increasing Scheme:
Step 0: p(0) := pmin, k = 1




2 ) = p
∗(p
(k−1)
−{1,2}), the smallest equilibrium of the restricted
duopoly game Γres(p
(k−1)
−{1,2}), under a fixed price vector p
(k−1)
−{1,2} for the remaining firms;






Step 0: q(0) := pmin, k = 1













A straightforward extension of the proof of Lemma 4.3.2 establishes that, once again,
p(0) ≤ p(1) ≤ · · · ≤ p(k) ≤ limk→∞p(k) = p∗(pre)
q(0) ≤ q(1) ≤ · · · ≤ q(k) ≤ limk→∞q(k) = p∗(post) (4.23)
It thus suffices to prove that q(k) ≥ p(k). The proof proceeds, once again, by induction.
pmin = q(0) ≥ p(0) = pmin. Assume, therefore, that q(k−1) ≥ p(k−1) for some k ≥ 1. Since
pmin and pmax are selected so as not to impact on the best response choices in either the




2 ) is an interior point
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1r − c′1r(d1r)}∂d1r∂p2j , ∀j = 1, . . . , lj. (4.25)
It follows from the (CM) condition and (4.1) that the second term to the far right of











≤ 0, ∀i = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . , li (4.26)
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3 , . . . , q
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n ) ≤ q
(k)
2 . (4.28)
Let Ψres denote the joint best response operator in the restricted duopoly Γres(q
(k−1)
−{1,2}),
which is, again, a supermodular game by condition (Sm). (By the strict quasi-concavity
condition these Γres is uniquely defined.) Let Ψres(r) denote the r-fold application of this













∗ ≤ Ψres(n)([q(k)1 , q
(k)















2 ]) is an equilibrium of the restricted duopoly and
hence component-wise larger than p∗(q
(k−1)
−{1,2}), the smallest equilibrium in this game, thus
verifying the second inequality in (4.29). The first inequality follows from the induction
assumption q(k−1) ≥ p(k−1) and in particular q(k−1)−{1,2} ≥ p
(k−1)
−{1,2}, as well as the fact that
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the smallest equilibrium in a supermodular game is a monotonically increasing vector
function of any parameter (string) such that each player’s payoff function in the game
is continuous and supermodular in the player’s action variables and the parameters, see




(k−1)) ≤ Ψi(q(k−1)) = q(k), i = 3, . . . , n (4.30)
where the inequality follows from the induction assumption and the fact that the best
response operator Ψi in the supermodular pre-merger game is non-increasing. (4.29) and
(4.30) together complete the induction step, i.e., they verify that q(k) ≥ p(k).
It remains to be shown that (4.27) and (4.28) hold. We prove (4.27), the proof of
(4.28) being analogous. Since the profit function π1 is strictly quasi-concave in firm 1’s
price vector p1, it has a unique local maximum for any given price vectors p2, . . . , pn




3 , . . . , q
(k−1)
n ) can be
obtained as the limit of a sequence {p1(t)}∞t=1 which optimizes the individual prices
(p11, p12, . . . , p1l1) of firm 1 in a Round Robin way. Thus, to prove (4.27) it suffices
to show that p1(t) ≤ q(k)1 for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . We prove this by induction. Clearly
p1(0) = q
(k)
1 . Assume p1(t) ≤ q
(k)
1 for some t ≥ 0. Let r ∈ {1, . . . , l1} denote the in-
dex of the product whose price is being optimized in the (t + 1)-st iteration. Note that
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n )} ≤ argmaxp1r{π1(q
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1r , thus verifying p1(t+1) ≤ q
(k)
1 and completing the induction proof. (The first inequal-












≤ 0 (,see (4.24),) and the quasi-concavity of the single vari-
able function π1(q
(k)







3 , . . . , q
(k)
n ).)
(b) The proof of part (b) is analogous to that of Theorem 4.3.5, using part (a) of this
theorem. 
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4.4 Connection with the Upward Pricing Pressure
Measure
Farrell and Shapiro (2010a) discuss the difficulty government agencies such as the An-
titrust Division of the DOJ and the FTC face in determining which proposed mergers are
to be scrutinized to evaluate whether the merger will “substantially lessen the competi-
tion in the industry,” the phrase used in Section 7 of the 1914 Clayton Act, as modified in
1950. Since 2000, firms with a “transaction value” above $50 million,who wish to engage
in a merger, are required to notify the DOJ and FTC of their plans, an outgrowth of the
1976 Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. (The transaction value is defined as the aggregate capital
value of the merging firms.) As a consequence, the DOJ and FTC reviewed, in 2008
alone, 1,726 proposed mergers and acquisitions with an aggregate value of more than $1
trillion.
The Clayton Act requires the government agency to “prove” in court that a proposed
merger would result in a “substantial lessoning of the competition in the industry,” based
on a comprehensive industry study. There is, therefore, a strong need for a fairly simple
“pre-screening” test to identify which of the thousands of merger proposals are most
likely to result in the greatest reductions of the competitive dynamics in an industry and
a commensurate reduction in consumer welfare.
Traditionally, the government has used simple market concentration measures as their
“litmus” test, in particular the so-called Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), defined as
the sum of the squares of the (anticipated) post-merger market shares in the industry.
Many economists have argued that this HHI-measure is a relatively limited predictor in
the particular case of differentiated products, and have proposed alternatives instead.
Building on ideas developed by O’Brien and Salop (2000) and Werden (1996), Farrell
and Shapiro (2010a) have advocated the use of so-called Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP)
measures instead of HHI. Based on the pre-merger equilibrium p∗(pre), the UPP increase
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(p∗l − Cl)δil > 05, (4.31)






| denotes the diversion ratio from product
i to product l, a term coined by Farrell and Shapiro (2010a). Let εii and εil respectively
denote product i’s own and cross-price elasticity with respect to product l, measured at
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In other words, the diversion ratio from product i to product l equals the ratio of the










, i = 1, . . . , I (4.34)













> 0, i = 1, . . . , I,
since Ti > 0 and
∂di
∂pi
< 0, see (4.1). Assume, for example, that the pre-merger industry
had settled on the smallest equilibrium p∗(pre). Then, the larger the UPP-measures
{T1, . . . , TI} are, the larger the price increases for the products of the merging firms in
their best response to the pre-merger equilibrium p∗(pre), i.e., the larger |Ψm(p∗(pre))−
5Farrell and Shapiro implicitly assume that the UPP-measures Ti are non-negative. As discussed
above, this is guaranteed to hold under the (CM) condition.
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p∗|.
While unstated in Farrell and Shapiro (2010a), the UPP-measures may thus be viewed
as proxies for the ultimate measure of interest:
|p∗(post)− p∗(pre)|∞ ≥ |Ψm(p∗(pre))− p∗|∞. (4.35)
The inequality (4.35) follows from the fact that p∗(pre) ≤ p∗(post), see Theorem 4.3.4
(a). This implies the simultaneous optimization variant of the tatônnement scheme in
the post-merger game Γpost, which starts at p∗(pre) ≤ p∗(post), generates an increasing
sequence of price vectors which converges to p∗(post):
p∗(pre) ≤ Ψm(p∗(pre)) ≤ Ψm(n)(p∗(pre)) ≤ Ψm(n+1)(p∗(pre)) ≤ p∗(post). (4.36)
Farrell and Shapiro (2010a) describe the above iterative scheme when motivating the use
of the UPP-measures, however without monotonicity or convergence proofs.
Farrell and Shapiro (2010a,b) also argue that it is considerably easier to evaluate
or estimate UPP measures as compared to conducting a full blown merger simulation.
Indeed, they argue that diversion ratios can often be estimated or approximated without
having to estimate the industry’s complete set of demand functions6. This has been
debated by various authors such as Epstein and Rubinfeld (2010) and Schmalensee (2009).
One of Farrell and Shapiro’s arguments is that, in contrast to traditional market
concentration measures or a full blown merger simulation, the UPP measures do not
require an upfront specification of the boundaries of the market being considered. This
is always a difficult question to resolve. As an example, the DOJ, when litigating to
prevent the merger between Oracle and Peoplesoft, identified the relevant market of
human relations and financial management systems as consisting of these two firms and
SAP. However, the court rejected the DOJ’s argument, identifying other suppliers of
6Farrell and Shapiro (2010b) states: “for example, horizontal or documentary evidence from win/loss
reports, discount approval processes, or customer switching patterns can be highly informative about
the diversion ratio.”
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related software and faulting the DOJ for an inadequate specification of the relevant
product market.
It is, of course, true that in most model specifications, estimates of own and cross-
price elasticities among the products of the merging firms depend on which set of firms
and products are included in the market model. However, it could be argued that these
elasticities are relatively insensitive to the market boundary choice. In fact, the DOJ/FTC
define the relevant market precisely by adding firms and products to the market of interest
until the price elasticities of the firms are insensitive to the further addition of new
products.
As to Farrell and Shapiro (2010a,b)’s argument that UPP measures are easier to
evaluate than complete merger simulations, it should be noted that merger simulations
may be reduced to implementing, say, the “simultaneous optimization” variant of the
tatônnement scheme in the post-merger game, starting from the current (pre-merger)
equilibrium price vector, see Lemma 4.3.1 and Theorem 4.3.4.
Schmalensee (2009), while praising Farrell and Shapiro (2010a) for “having made a
significant contribution that has the potential to improve merger enforcement,” takes
issue with their recommendation to use the UPP measure as the indicator by which to
rank different merger proposals as the “quantity is unrelated to any measure of customer
harm”. Instead, Schmalensee (2009) argues for the use of an approximate estimate of
post-merger price changes and proposes Price Change Assuming Linearity (PCAL) as
an alternative to UPP. PCAL calculates the post-merger equilibrium assuming all cost-
functions are linear and all demand functions for the products of the merging firms are
linear as well. An additional major assumption is that the demand functions of the
products of the merging firms do not depend on the prices of the other firms in the
industry, effectively assuming that the merged firm can operate as a monopolist. The
results in this essay show that the post-merger equilibrium can be calculated as the
limit vector of an increasing sequence of best response price vectors to the pre-merger
(observed) equilibrium. To compute this sequence, one needs to postulate a system
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of demand functions. If the above linear functions - without dependence on prices of
non-merging firms - is deemed adequate, this can be used to generate the price change
estimates. However, if other specifications (that result in supermodular profit functions)
seem more reasonable, these can be evaluated with little effort as well, on the basis of
the above simple tatônnement scheme.
4.5 Conclusions and Extentions
In the preceding sections, we have provided broad conditions under which, in the absence
of cost synergies, a horizontal merger with asymmetric firms and differentiated products
necessarily results in an increase in prices and profits for all firms (merged and unmerged).
However, we have also demonstrated that constant, marginal cost synergies for the merg-
ing firms may be sufficiently large as to reduce the price of some or all firms. These two
results, as well as the additional comparative statics results used to obtain them, will be
of great use to theoreticians and antitrust litigators alike. As is generally the case, there
are several avenues for future investigation which would complement the work contained
herein.
For instance, one might consider back-testing our results on data from historical merg-
ers with settings appropriate to our model. Work by Werden and Froeb (1994) provides
an example of this sort of empirical investigation in the merger simulation literature. It
would also be of interest to identify when the marginal increase in aggregate profits due
to the acquisition of a new firm is larger when this firm is acquired by a larger coalition of
firms. In addition to direct extensions, we also feel that the operations literature would
greatly benefit from a more comprehensive investigation of the operational cost syner-
gies resulting from such mergers. Work modeling actual cost synergies arising in various
operational settings and investigating their impact on equilibrium performance measures
would be of great benefit to the OM and Economic communities. Such a literature would
have the potential to impact the way firms consider mergers as well as the anti-trust
114
policy and litigation surrounding proposed mergers.
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Appendix A
Appendices for Chapter 2
A.1 Two Sample t-Tests
In this appendix, we report on the two-sample t-tests (assuming unequal variances) we
conducted on all national waiting time observations for each of the six hamburger chains
to verify whether the waiting time distributions vary by chain. The critical values for
each test, with an alpha of 0.05, consistently rounded to 1.96. The t statistic is reported
in the right-hand section of the table below.
Table A.1: Two-Sample t-Test on National Chain-Wide Wait Time Observa-
tions (unit = seconds)
Chain Num. Mean Std. Mc Burger Wendy’s White Dairy Steak
Obs. Wait Dev. Donald’s King Castle Queen ’n Shake
McDonald’s 598 224 151 – 4.09 6.66 -3.98 -0.70 -3.86
Burger King 600 192 117 -4.09 – 2.89 -7.25 -5.15 -7.70
Wendy’s 596 173 110 -6.66 -2.89 – -9.13 -7.92 -9.93
White Castle 334 269 174 3.98 7.25 9.13 – 3.57 0.55
Dairy Queen 528 230 128 0.70 5.15 7.92 -3.57 – -3.40
Steak ’n Shake 328 263 141 3.86 7.70 9.93 -0.55 3.40 –
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A.2 The Optimization Routine
To mitigate the difficulties associated with the optimization problem (2.13), we restrict
the feasible region for the parameter vector θ by imposing several reasonable constraints.




Sj,b,m(P,W,X|θ)/h(b,m), b = 1, . . . , B;m = 1, . . . ,M
= the fraction of the population in tract b and socio-economic group m
which purchases a fast-food meal;
con(con) = an upper (lower) bound for the fraction of the population in any geographical
area and any socio-economic group to purchase a fast-food meal;
Jk = {j : k(j) = k} denotes the set of outlets belonging to chain k;













Pj : k = 1, . . . , K.
We impose the constraints:
con ≤ con(θ)b,m ≤ con, for all b = 1 . . . , B and m = 1 . . . ,M, (A.1)
ck ≤ ĉk(θ) ≤ ck, for all k = 1 . . . , K 1. (A.2)
Thus, instead of the unconstrained problem (2.13), we solve the constrained optimization
problem: (P ) minθ {(2.13) s.t. (2.14) and (2.15)} . To solve the constrained optimization
problem, we replaced the soft constraints (2.14) and (2.15) by penalty functions which
penalize any violations of these constraints. The penalty functions are multiplied with
a common multiplier Λ which, within the course of our iterative algorithm is reduced
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log[ck − ĉk(θ)] + log[ĉk(θ)− ck]}.
We have developed a special algorithm to solve (P ) via the modified objective (A.3).
We begin with a large value for Λ, the weight of the penalty functions, roughly two or-
ders of magnitude larger than the objective function value at the starting point. This
is an application of the general barrier method approach for constrained non-linear op-
timization. The algorithm invokes a quasi-Newton search method. During this search,
we restrict movement in the direction of the barriers imposed by the penalty functions
so that any point within the interior of the feasible region can be reached, but points
along the barrier are not approached very quickly, thus preventing the algorithm from
’trapping’ itself in unfavorable points. When a stopping condition is reached, the penalty
weight Λ is halved and the modified quasi-Newton search re-run. In the first iteration,
when the penalty Λ is large, this generally results in the algorithm moving to a point
which is quite far from the barriers. The algorithm iterates until the penalty weight is
small enough to render the penalty terms insignificant compared to the regular objective
function (2.13). Since, by the termination of the algorithm, the multiplier is reduced to
an insignificant number, the algorithm optimizes the true objective function (2.13) over
the feasible region described by the constraints (A.1) and (A.2).
To arrive at the reported estimates, we used a process in which, in the first stage, we
took 20 starting points and ran the above algorithm with two different initial values of
the penalty parameter Λ - one two orders of magnitude larger than the other - resulting
in two estimates per starting point. For each of the 20 starting points we chose the
estimate (of the two) that resulted in the lower objective function (excluding the penalty
function), generated a weighting matrix for this estimate from the covariance matrix. In
the second-stage we ran our algorithm starting with this estimate and weighting matrix,
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again from both Λ values generating 40 final estimates.
A.3 The Macro-Moments
We have added macro-moments that are based on three demographic features: age, race,
and gender. We use the study by Paeratakul et al. (2003), which reports the proportion
of people in various demographic groups that consume fast-food over a two day period.
As suggested in Thomadsen (2005a), the macro-moments are constructed based on the
idea that the consumption ratio of related demographic groups in Cook County should
be close to the national consumption ratios. For example, the local ratio of men to
women consuming a fast-food meal should match the national ratio, i.e., the percentage
of women consuming fast-food in Cook County may differ from the national average but
the fraction of men consuming should differ from the national average proportionally to
women. The following twelve macro-moments were added to the micro-moments, based


















































where R0−9 denotes the national fraction of fast-food consumers who belong to the 0-9
age bracket as estimated by the Paeratakul et al. (2003) study, Pop0−9 denotes the Cook
County population in this age bracket, and Qj,0−9(θ) denotes the demand of consumers
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age 0-9 at outlet j. Similar definitions pertain to the other R , Pop , and Q numbers.
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Appendix B
Appendices for Chapter 3
B.1 Single-Crossing Property for Segment-by-Segment
Profit Functions
The single-crossing property discussed in Section 3.3 was first introduced by Milgrom
and Shannon (1994) as a close variant to the preceding “Spence-Mirrlees” single-crossing
condition, see Edlin and Shannon (1998). The Monotonicity Theorem (Theorem 4) in
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) shows that this single crossing property is, in fact, equiva-
lent to each of the best response functions being monotonically increasing.
Lemma B.1.1 Fix j = 1,...,N
For each market segment k = 1,...,K the profit function πjk(p) has the single-crossing
































> 0 ∀m 6= j. (B.1)
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[1− (pj − cj)gj(Y, pj)(1− 2Sjkhk )]}. (B.3)




= Sjk[1− (pj − cj)gj(Y, pj)(1−
Sjk
hk





1− (pj − cj)gj(Y, pj)(1− 2
Sjk
hk
) > 0⇔ 0 < ∂Sjk
∂pm








(The second equivalence follows from
∂Sjk
∂pm
> 0, see (3.19). The last identity follows from
(B.3)). 
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